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Banks provide several benefits that contribute to the growth of an emerging market economy, 
such as collecting savings from various sources and enabling borrowers to borrow these funds 
and invest in profitable sectors (De Ferro, 2013). Banks contribute to the growth of essential 
sectors of the economy and thereby influence a country's economy. Before making investment 
decisions, investors use credit ratings to determine the risk of investing in a specific country. This 
study aimed to define the extent to which sovereign credit rating (SCR) announcements influence 
the behaviour of bank share prices in the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa), which are emerging market countries. 
A quantitative research methodology was used to analyse data from January 2010 to December 
2017 using an experimental research design. The data was collected from Bloomberg. The 
investigation carried out was an event study using the daily share price of banks, and the All 
Share Total Return Index of each country as the benchmark proxy, to determine whether 
abnormal returns (ARs) exist following an SCR announcement. 
This study did not find statistically significant evidence of SCR announcements in the period 
January 2010 to December 2017. The results indicated that emerging market banks are efficient 
and do not significantly react to SCR announcements (downgrades, upgrades and rating 
outlooks). This is in line with previous research on the topic. The study concluded that there is no 
relationship between the SCR announcements and the share prices in BRICS emerging market 
banks.   
Knowing the actual impact of SCR announcements on the banking sector would have an effect 
on investors, governments and asset holders by providing them with country risk assessments 
and allowing them to rebalance their portfolios as necessary. This study has important information 
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Credit ratings have grown in importance for investors as they look to invest their capital in 
countries with low default rates. As the number of investment opportunities increases across 
global and emerging markets, investors are faced with the challenge of selecting countries to 
invest in. Credit ratings are therefore an essential tool in giving investors insight into the risk of 
investing their money in a particular country, based on its ability to settle its debt (Ryan, 2012). 
Credit ratings are important for banks as they affect the banks’ access to capital investments from 
other countries. This study thus investigated the relationship between sovereign credit ratings 
(SCR) announcements and the share prices of banks within emerging markets. This was done 
by employing an event study. The share price reaction of the banks was compared with changes 
in SCRs, which are issued by the three large credit rating agencies, namely Moody’s, Fitch, and 
Standard & Poor’s. 
This research is significant as it provides information about how the emerging market banks react 
to changes in SCRs, which will offer borrowers and lenders a greater understanding of the 
markets they are investing in. In addition, this study adds to the body of knowledge about credit 
rating effects on emerging markets. Finally, the performance of financial markets is positively 
influenced by SCRs and thus the role of credit rating institutions in influencing market efficiency 
is significant (Mutize, 2018). 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. A short overview of the background to the study is given 
in Section 1.2. The research problem is stated in Section 1.3. The research question is discussed 
in Section 1.4. The purpose is discussed in Section 1.5 and Section 1.6 highlights the objectives 
that the study aimed to address. The methodology used to address the research questions is 
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described in Section 1.7 and the importance of the study is dealt with in Section 1.8. The 
contributions of the study are identified in Section 1.9.  
 
1.2 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
The involvement of credit rating agencies (CRAs) in emerging market countries has increased 
significantly over the last two decades, and the significance of CRAs in emerging markets, as well 
as their ability to cause volatility and economic instability in these markets, has been a major topic 
of debate and research. SCRs are used by investors as an indicator of the political, economic and 
financial state of the country and thus determines, the level of foreign investment in the country. 
(Erdem & Varli, 2014). Williams, Al-Sakka and Ap Gwilym (2015) note that SCRs strengthen a 
country's ability to acquire foreign capital in different ways. 
Investment in emerging market countries usually bears higher risk compared to investment 
opportunities in developed economies which are more risky economies to invest in (Williams et 
al., 2015). Foreign investors, therefore, rely greatly on CRAs to provide information on the risk of 
investing in emerging market economies. By providing this information CRAs help institutions in 
emerging market countries to attract foreign capital. Foreign investment will accelerate the 
development of emerging markets and thus create economic growth (Bumann, Hermes & 
Lensink, 2013). 
The financial crisis in 2008 showed that investors have linked the banking sector of the economy 
with the success of the local government. One of the main reasons that Correa, Lee, Sapriza and 
Suarez (2014) found for this relationship is that investors expect the government to bail out low-
performing banks. As a result, banks that are known to be dependent on their government's 
financial backing depend on their government to bail them out in the event of bankruptcy. Banks 
will be more severely affected than others in the case of sovereign credit downgrades as a result 
of the ‘sovereign ceiling trend’. The sovereign ceiling trend is where banks’ credit ratings are 
usually confined to the SCR issued to the country in which the banks operate; thus the adjustment 
in SCRs is likely to influence both the market interest rates and the cost of raising capital (Correa 
et al., 2014). 
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Correa et al. (2014) demonstrate that SCR downgrades had a negative effect on the ARs of banks 
shares and has a negative impact on the banking sector of the economy. It is important to know 
the effect of a change in SCRs is on the banking sector in BRICS emerging markets. This will 
give policy makers a better idea of how to manage any such impact. Given recent political 
instability and a significant number of SCR downgrades experienced by BRICS emerging markets 
over the last decade, it is vital for policy makers and large investors to know how to reduce any 
negative effects of future SCR downgrades. 
 
This study is important for investors that are constantly seeking an accurate understanding of 
sovereign default risk in order to determine the creditworthiness of securities of sovereigns while 
establishing the required return. 
 
1.2.1 ROLE OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES GLOBALLY 
 
CRAs analyse a country’s ability to pay off its debt obligations in a timely manner (Bessis, 2010). 
The probability that a country may default on its debt obligations is reflected through the credit 
ratings assigned to a company or country. The changes from one rating to the next are not 
spontaneous; they reflect the long-term worthiness of the country’s ability to settle its debt 
obligations. Rating changes are usually caused by major changes in market conditions that could 
cause the country to default on its debt obligations.  
CRAs have an advantage as they have a much larger historical dataset and specialised models 
to issue these credit ratings. Ryan (2012) argues that due to the larger dataset, the agencies 
provide an invaluable amount of information to individual institutions. He asserts that CRAs act 
as regulators in the market to establish a uniform global benchmark for global credit risk, which 
provides a reference for the international regulatory standards (Ryan, 2012).  





1.2.2 ROLE OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES WITHIN EMERGING MARKETS 
 
The importance of credit ratings has increased significantly and this is predominantly due to the 
rapid expansion of emerging markets (Williams et al., 2015). S&P 's coverage of sovereign 
ratings, for instance, grew from seven in 1975 to 129 in December 2014, with growth primarily 
coming from developing countries seeking access to global markets (Williams et al., 2015). Credit 
ratings are important for emerging market countries as they serve as a tool to better position these 
countries to gain access to foreign direct investment (Al-Sakka & Ap Gwilym, 2009). Kim and Wu 
(2008) found evidence to indicate that an upgrade rating has a positive effect on foreign direct 
investment, as well as portfolio and international bank flows in emerging markets.  
CRAs can either upgrade a country’s rating when the country is doing well or downgrade it in 
difficult times. Either a downgrade or upgrade change should communicate new information to 
the market about a particular country. Credit rating downgrades can, however, result in emerging 
market countries experiencing great difficulty in trying to raise capital effectively. Each of the 
ratings causes changes to the interest owed and the cost of borrowing to investors (Kaminsky & 
Schmukler, 2002).  
The disclosure of information through rating actions is more important for emerging market 
economies, as the problem of asymmetric information, as well as, transparency is more severe 
than in developed economies (Bruha, Karber, Pierluigi & Setzer, 2017). 
The role of CRAs within emerging market countries was analysed above and they are seen to 
play a significant role in accessing foreign capital investment. CRAs also play a role for investors. 
 
1.2.3 ROLE OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES FOR INVESTORS 
 
Financial market investors are major users of credit ratings. White (2013) affirms that investors 
require information about the risk of their investments. This information could come from the 
investor, but the CRA’s rating strengthens the information as it is the opinion of a third party.  
Credit ratings given to a specific country have become more important because they are seen as 
an assessment of the country’s risk and ability to service its debt obligations. Investors and 
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portfolio managers who have invested in foreign companies are particularly interested in the 
SCRs given to that country (Martell, 2005). Investors are also attracted to investing in emerging 
markets as there is potential to make more profit because of the higher risk associated with an 
emerging market. 
CRAs impact banks in several ways, which are discussed below. 
 
1.2.4 ROLE OF CREDIT RATINGS FOR BANKS 
  
The role of banks is to create money and facilitate monetary exchanges (De Ferro, 2013). Most 
well-functioning economies cannot function optimally without having key components such as 
financial institutions (Baily & Elliott, 2013). Banks draw together borrowers and lenders of money 
and are seen as critical constituents of a properly functioning economy. They offer many benefits 
that assist in the development of an economy, such as gathering savings from multiple sources 
and offering investors the chance to borrow these funds and invest in productive sectors (De 
Ferro, 2013). 
Emerging markets are highly sensitive to credit rating announcements. Williams, Al-Sakka and 
Ap Gwilym (2013) emphasise that credit rating announcements affect most national banks in 
emerging market countries. Deterioration of a country’s credit ratings pushes up the costs of funds 
for banks, which means that banks will see lower returns when the funds are used for loans to 
borrowers (Panetta, Correa, Davies, Di Cesare, Marques, Nadal de Simone, Signoretti, Vespro, 
Vildo, Wieland & Zaghini, 2011). Credit rating downgrades are likely to slow down economic 
activity and lower the profitability of banks (Correa et al., 2014). 
This study focused on banks in the BRICS countries because they are fast-developing countries 
and have a great influence on the global market (Asongu, 2016). Banks have a great influence 
on the economy and the overall financial development of a country, as the banking system has 
become more complex and highly developed (Petkovski & Kjosevski, 2014). If a bank had to 
default on a loan, it would cause a considerable loss of wealth for investors and a country’s 
economy. One of the approaches to preventing defaults and severe loss of wealth is to obtain 
information from multiple forms of intermediaries such as CRAs that operate in the capital market 
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to assist with ensuring the smooth performance of the capital market (Habib, Nazir, Hashmi & 
Saeed, 2016). 
A deterioration in credit ratings affects financial institutions, particularly banks, in emerging 
countries, which in turn puts an even greater strain on an already tough economic climate within 
these countries, as well as increases the cost of borrowing and gaining access to international 
investments for banks (Heinke, 2006).   
 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
The research problem is twofold: firstly, there is an insufficient body of research on the impact of 
SCR announcements on banks’ share prices in BRICS. Most of the studies conducted on bank 
share price behaviour have focused on developed countries or other emerging market countries, 
but little is known about the impact on BRICS banks. Therefore, there was a strong need to 
conduct a study to examine the relationship between banks in BRICS emerging markets and SCR 
announcements. 
Secondly, some market participants have more information than others; this is known as 
information asymmetry. Information asymmetry usually arises when the lender of capital is less 
knowledgeable about the circumstances the borrower is facing when entering into a contract with 
the borrower (Karimu, 2020). The lender of capital might make a different decision if they were 
aware of the information that the borrowers were withholding. Consequently, CRAs act as 
information intermediaries, producing new information independently and verifying the 
creditworthiness of borrowers, and thereby correcting information imbalances between issuers 
and investors (Brown, Hillegeist & Lo, 2009). Boot, Milbourn and Schmeits (2005) argue that 
CRAs offer a third-party opinion to borrowers and lenders, thus reducing the problem of 
asymmetric information. 
Therefore, this study fills the information gap between BRICS countries and investors by 
addressing whether CRAs carry any new information to investors on the effect of SCR 





1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Efficient capital markets are markets ‘… in which prices always fully reflect available information’ 
(Fama, 1970:383). If investors all have the same information, there should not be any opportunity 
for them to make (ARs). However, previous studies demonstrate that this is not always the case. 
Weinstein (1977) and Pinches and Singleton (1978) agree that there are no significant returns on 
securities following a credit rating announcement. Consistent with this finding, Wakeman (1981) 
and Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) argue that CRAs add no value to investors as they only have 
access to already available public information. In line with this, Li, Visaltanachoti and Kesayan 
(2004) indicate that CRAs base their ratings on public information, and therefore the ratings 
issued have no real substance or value to investors, as investors are presumably well informed.  
Despite these findings, there have still been some mixed results, with Kräussl (2003) 
acknowledging that rating agencies play an important role in providing third-party opinions about 
the overall risk of debt instruments and are particularly helpful in providing transparency and 
efficiency. A study conducted by Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) revealed significant market 
movement when credit rating downgrades were announced. Taking into account the mixed 
evidence regarding credit rating announcements, the question which then arises is: 
Do credit rating announcements generate any additional information for emerging market 
banks? 
 
1.5 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The purpose of this research was to shed light on the impact of CRAs on banks of emerging 
countries. As far as it could be established, this is the first research of its kind to be conducted on 
the banking industry of the BRICS countries. This study is important as CRAs provide information 
to market participants who make investment decisions based on this information about credit risk. 
These ratings are also vital to institutional investors as they are mandated to hold only investment-
grade securities in their portfolios. As the demand for international investors to diversify their 
portfolios in other countries rises, they rely on CRAs to provide credit risk information before 
making their investment decisions (Williams et al., 2015). Therefore, this study provides investors 
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with information on the reaction of banks in the BRICS emerging markets. Ismailescu and Kazemi 
(2010) argue that emerging market countries are the highest borrowers of capital, and therefore 
credit ratings are extremely important for them.  
 
Results of the study will benefit investors, portfolio managers and other stakeholders who use 
SCR announcements to measure movements in share prices. Evidence from analysing share 
price reaction to SCR announcements in developing markets (BRICS) casts more light on whether 
the efficient market hypothesis is supported or contradicted by empirical findings (Rono, 2013). 
To accomplish the purpose of the study, the objective below was developed. 
 
1.6 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
The primary objective of this study was to conduct an event study to determine if changes in credit 
ratings effect the behaviour of bank share prices in emerging market countries. CRAs also use 
outlooks to inform the market participants of possible upcoming rating changes while keeping the 
current SCR unchanged (Bannier & Hirsch, 2010). Thus the secondary objective was to determine 
the effect of credit rating outlook announcements, as they provide an economic function as well 
(Boot & Schmeits, 2006).  
 
1.7 METHODOLOGY  
 
An event study was conducted to achieve the objectives of this research. The three major credit 
rating agencies, namely Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Fitch, were considered, which 
cover 80% of SCRs. The BRICS countries are Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The 
observation period ranged from 2010 to 2017.  
The top banks (Brazil: Itaú Unibanco, Banco do Brasil, Banco Bradesco; Russia: Sberbank, VTB 
Bank, Gazprombank; India: State Bank of India, Bank of Baroda, ICICI Bank, Punjab National 
Bank, HDFC Bank Ltd, Canara Bank, Axis Bank Ltd, City Union Bank of India; China: China 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank Corporation, China 
Agricultural Bank of China, China Bank of China, ACGBY US Equity; South Africa: Capitec, 
Standard Bank, Nedbank, Barclays, First Rand) based on market capital were used, which was 
9 
 
sufficient to capture the essence of the banking industry for that particular emerging market 
economy. They have the biggest influence on the market’s economy. 
This research differs from other studies as it examines the emerging market banking industry, 
whereas other studies have focused on developed countries. 
 By obtaining the daily data of the banks’ closing share price, this research answers the question 
‘Do credit rating announcements generate any additional information for emerging market 
banks?’ By using the event study approach, this research identified any effects of external events 
such as credit rating announcements. Therefore, this research studied how the banks’ share price 
reaction, as indicated by abnormal returns (ARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), 
fluctuates on average around a particular period of the announcement. 
Evidence of ARs and CARs indicate whether SCRs have an effect on banks’ share prices in 
BRICS emerging markets. If the news is positive, this should increase the share price; 
subsequently, a downgrade announcement should decrease the banks’ share price. If there is 
movement before the announcement date, this suggests that the market is not efficient as 
information was leaked into the market and caused a change in the share price. An event window 
of 10 days before the event and 10 days after the event was therefore used to identify if there 
were any ARs before and after the event date. 
 
1.8 IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
This research will provide investors with credit rating information on the banks of emerging market 
countries, so they can broaden their investment horizon to the emerging market countries in which 
they have more confidence. Investors assess the risk of investing in a particular country before 
making their investing decisions (Amstad & Packer, 2015). This study, therefore, focused on the 
credit ratings of banks in emerging markets to assist investors who want to invest in a riskier 
market.  Investors may perceive the banks in emerging markets as a potential advantage to them 





1.9 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS STUDY 
 
The incentive to explore the research of this space has stemmed from the growing importance of 
the financial market to the overall welfare of the economy. The capital market makes use of credit 
ratings to determine if CRAs provide any superior information that is not already available to the 
market. Below is a summary of the contributions of this research study: 
 
 This research will provide investors with new information on how these banks can 
withstand rating changes.  
 This study contributes to the financial literature and understanding of the movement of 
banks’ share prices after a credit rating change.  
 Based on the efficient market hypothesis, Fama (1970) asserts that a share price is a 
reflection of all the available information. A company’s share price should therefore not be 
affected by a credit rating announcement. This research aimed to determine if CRAs can 
diminish the effects of asymmetric information by ensuring that both the lenders and 
borrowers have the same amount of information so that both parties are fully aware of all 
the risk involved before investing in the BRICS banking industry.  
 Williams et al. (2013) state that SCRs have a strong correlation to banks. If there is a 
negative SCR change, they say that this affect the banks’ cost of capital, profitability 
earned from lending and the banks’ capital requirements. This could have a negative 
impact on the economy. Governments can counter this effect by understanding the effects 
of negative SCRs and implement actions through policies that can directly affect the 







 From this study, managers of asset portfolios will become aware of possible implications 
of rating changes and can then adjust their strategies by incorporating timely and 
appropriate decision making. 
 This information is valuable to any investor interested in the emerging markets. Investors 
will become conscious of the effect that credit rating announcements have on banks when 
making investment decisions. There are many indicators that investors use when making 
investment decisions, and often they use credit risk as one of those decisive measures.  
 
1.11 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
 
The research is organised as follows: Chapter 1 introduces the research topic and provides a 
brief background on banks and credit ratings. Chapter 2 presents the detailed literature review, 
which focuses on the effects of credit rating announcements globally, and then on emerging 
markets. The research methodology is described in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 includes an analysis of 
data and presents the findings and interpretation of results. The findings and further 












This chapter provides an overall view of relevant previous literature, to allow for a better 
interpretation of the empirical results of this study. Furthermore, previous literature is discussed 
to understand the hypothesis-building process and other elements of the research design outlined 
in this dissertation. 
A large body of literature has been exploring the impact of SCR changes on financial markets in 
developed countries, but only a few studies have been dedicated to examining the net effect of 
SCR announcements on emerging markets, and relatively few have investigated the effect on 
banks. 
This literature review proceeds as follows: First, the researcher analyses the foundation and 
popularity of CRAs and their capability to provide investors with creditworthy information. Studies 
are then highlighted which track the CRA journey from reputational damage to causes of rating 
changes. The literature review then concludes with an overview of studies investigating developed 
and developing financial markets' sovereign rating information efficiency and effects on banks. 
 
2.2 THE FOUNDATION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 
 
Towards the late 1820s, the United States of America (USA) found it difficult to raise funds for its 
railroad projects. The railroad companies could not raise capital from banks, because banks were 
not willing to fund them. The only option left for the railroad companies was to form an international 
bond market to raise the capital (Sylla, 2001).  
During this period, investors required credit rating information on these US railroad companies 
which led to the development of credit rating agencies. CRAs provided investors with financial 
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and credit information about US railroad corporations (Sylla, 2001). Moody’s rating agency was 
the first to provide and publish bond credit ratings for the US railroad corporations in 1909 (White, 
2010b). In 1922, John Knowles Fitch founded Fitch Ratings International to provide bond credit 
ratings. In 1941, the two separate entities Poor’s and Standards amalgamated to form one entity, 
today known as Standards & Poor’s (White, 2010a). 
The ‘big three’ CRAs sought to gain control of the market and become the most popular issuers 
of credit ratings. 
 
2.3 THE POPULARITY OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 
 
In the 1900s, banks were failing as they were lending money to borrowers that could not settle 
their debts. The US Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) passed a regulation in 1939 
compelling banks to invest in investment-grade assets (White, 2010b). This regulation not only 
made CRAs popular but mandated corporations to invest in securities that were investment grade.  
The wide need for corporations and investors to make less risky investments has increased the 
popularity of credit ratings. Moody’s, Standards & Poor’s (S&P) and Fitch provide most countries 
with SCRs and they are recognised by the SEC in the USA (Elkhoury, 2009).  
 
2.4 INFORMATIONAL CONTENT OF CREDIT RATINGS IN FINANCIAL MARKETS 
 
Credit ratings bring value to market participants in different aspects. For potential investors and 
other market participants, they provide an important source of information to assess financial risk 
White (2013). 
Many studies have examined the informational value of these announcements in financial markets 
(see, for example, Ederington, Yawitz and Roberts (1987); Hand and Holthausen (1992); Steiner 
and Heinke (2001)). Hand and Holthausen (1992) were among the first researchers to conduct 
an event study to better understand the effect of credit rating announcements. Their sample for 
their research was from 1977 to 1982. The general conclusion was that the bond market responds 
to rating change announcements. 
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CRAs play a vital role in acting as a regulator within the industry and offering guidance to emerging 
markets (Smith & Fryer, 2012). This is in support of Kräussl’s notion (2003) as he states that 
CRAs help countries gain access to foreign capital. SCRs aid in the stability and overall growth 
of an economy (Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, Brooks & Yip, 2006). 
A credit rating is an opinion that indicates the likelihood that a company will default on its financial 
obligations. This opinion is based on its balance sheet debt, as well as its non-balance sheet debt 
items and complex debt items (Cherny, 2014).   
Investors use credit ratings when making investment decisions, so they do not have to perform 
their own in-depth investigation into the creditworthiness of a company. If investors had to perform 
their own investigations, it could take a great deal of time, become costly and require expert 
knowledge (Amtenbrink & De Haan, 2009). Thus, companies prefer outsourcing this critical task 
to widely used CRAs. CRAs have a major impact on investors, according to Kräussl (2003), as 
they influence which debt instruments investors can hold onto in their portfolios.  
CRAs provide a monitoring service that offers information to companies and countries about their 
credit risk (De Haan & Amtenbrink, 2011). This guides countries and companies to take corrective 
action to avoid a possible downgrade. Danos, Holt and Imhoff (1989) established that CRAs are 
professional, provide expert advice on a company’s financial system and offer valuable 
information which assists the public in decision making. 
Fitzpatrick and Sagers (2009) downplay the importance of credit ratings by stating that rating 
agencies do not provide the market with useful information and there is little information to support 
their usefulness. Wakeman (1981) argues that rating agencies have no economic effect as they 
only act as auditors with their rating services.  
Wakeman (1981) and Kidwell (1988) suggest that companies that issue bonds are willing to buy 
these services from agencies due to the provision of an independent review. This idea was 
supported by and Macey (2006) who maintain that the constant demand for ratings on countries’ 
debt by market participants contradicts the notion that CRAs are unnecessary. Investors make 
use of these independent views to align their portfolios and to make investment decisions. Some 
investment mandates restrict portfolio managers to invest in countries that have been rated above 
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investment grade (Hsueh & Kidwell, 1988). This research used SCRs, as investors are often 
mandated to invest in countries above investment grade. 
Credit ratings can be used to predict future behaviours of companies. Dichev and Piotroski (2001) 
found a significant impact on equity returns when downgrades occurred and no abnormalities in 
returns when upgrades occurred. Their study revealed that downgrades should be seen as a 
relatively strong predictor of future deterioration of a company’s earnings.  
Rating agencies provide another service known as outlooks. These outlooks are an indication of 
possible future rating changes (Bannier & Hirsch, 2010). Rating outlooks are based on both 
quantitative and qualitative analyses of a company or country and are primarily a value opinion 
provided by the agency (Al-Sakka & Ap Gwilym, 2012). 
Konijna and Rijkena (2011) studied the degree to which outlook information relates to the 
expectations of investors, using S&P outlook notifications from 1991 to 2005. Their findings show 
a negative outlook announcement results in a significant negative AR response.  
As a result, CRAs serve as information intermediaries to the market and separately generate new 
information on the creditworthiness of borrowers (Brown et al., 2009). CRAs can be seen as 
problem solvers, as they can reduce the problem of information asymmetry between the 
borrowers and lenders (Listokin & Taibleson, 2010). 
 
2.5 INFORMATION ASYMMETRY  
 
The key point that favour the informational content of credit ratings and their potential to minimise 
information asymmetry is focused on the fact that CRAs say that they have access to inside 
information. Investors in emerging market securities are cautious to new information because of 
lack of transparency (Odera, 2012). 
 
Seyhun (1998) argues that insiders possess more information than investors. Investors suffer 
from a lack of knowledge of what happens within companies, this is known as the information 
asymmetry between the management of a company and investors. This knowledge gap will be 
costly to investors that invest in companies whilst not knowing the credit risks of that company 
(Steeman, 2002).  
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The function of CRAs is to bridge this information gap between investors and companies which 
will help to attract investor funds. CRAs minimise information asymmetries between investors and 
companies, and thereby assist with developing the financial markets (Galil, 2003). 
CRAs thus offer valuable information to investors and market participants. Investors rely on this 
information to guide them in their decision-making process; these ratings are meant to be free 
from bias and accurate. However, sometimes they are not. 
 
2.6 INACCURATE RATING INFORMATION PUBLISHED BY CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 
 
International CRAs have been at the centre of some of the major financial crises. They were 
blamed for the major market collapse of New York in the 1970s, the Asian financial crisis in the 
1990s, the Enron scandal in 2001 and the global financial crisis of 2008 (Verschoor, 2007; 
Mullard, 2012).  
CRAs need to maintain a standard of excellence when it comes to issuing ratings, as their 
existence is based on the reputation and accuracy of the credit rating issued (Partnoy, 2007). 
According to Mullard (2012), the performance of credit rating agencies in structured finance 
products has raised questions about the quality of their credit ratings in general and the integrity 
of the rating process. As a result, investors have lost confidence in the ability of CRAs to provide 
them with accurate and creditworthy information.  
CRAs provided insolvent investors with favourable credit scores and permitted high risk 
mortgage-related commitments that were at the core of the 2008 debt crisis that could not have 
been marketed or sold without their high investment-grade approvals from rating agencies (Bolton 
et al., 2012). 
The reason for the inaccurate predictions is outdated business models and mathematical models 
used by CRAs when assessing an institution (Altman & Rijken, 2004). Mullard (2012) supports 
the idea that rating agencies have standard mathematical models that are not modified to absorb 
the changing mortgage structures.  
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Despite their given shortcomings, CRAs appear to play a significant informative role in different 
markets. Their advantage seems to be based on their access to inside information (Ederington et 
al., 1987; Goh & Ederington, 1993; Jorion, Liu & Shi, 2005).  
The ability of borrowers to pay back their debts is shown through SCRs. Governments and 
investors are interested in SCRs to make investment decisions (Afonso, Gomes & Rother, 2011). 
It is therefore important for market participants to know what factors influence and cause changes 
to credit ratings (Montes, De Oliveira & De Mendonҫa, 2016). 
 
2.7 WHAT CAUSES CREDIT RATINGS TO CHANGE?  
 
Avramov, Chordia, Jostova and Philipov (2009) demonstrated a trend that institutional investors 
disinvest when a company’s credit rating is downgraded or dropped from investment grade to 
speculative grade. This can have a significant impact on a company’s share price. It is therefore 
important to understand what causes credit ratings to change.  
Cantor and Packer (1996) point out that CRAs analyse a country’s per capita income, GDP 
growth, inflation, fiscal balance, external balance, external debt, economic development and 
default history when setting a credit rating for a country.  
An empirical study by Afonso et al. (2011) identified the short- and long-term factors that cause 
ratings to change. They used a linear regression model and the results revealed that in the short 
term, GDP growth, public debt and government balances are the main factors which cause 
changes to ratings. The long-term factors are external reserves, external debt and the efficacy of 
the government. Kim and Wu (2008) stress that a country will need to focus on financial 
development to attract a positive credit rating. 
Luitel, Vanpée and De Moor (2016) report that CRAs are not always transparent with their 
methods of calculating and assigning ratings. Despite this, Cantor and Packer (1996) establish 
that credit rating changes can be related to economic development, GDP growth rate, inflation in 
the country and the income produced by the country. According to Cantor and Packer (1996) and 
Kisgen (2006), the capital structure of a company is a key factor in determining the rating issued 
to the company.  
18 
 
Erdem and Varli (2014) postulate that macroeconomic variables such as foreign reserves to GDP, 
the ratio of external debt to export, and the ratio of budget balance to GDP impact the SCRs of 
emerging markets. Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz (1999) report that rating agencies are pro-cyclic, which 
means that they increase SCRs when the country’s economy is in good health and decrease the 
rating when the country is facing bad times.  
The reasons for rating changes vary and are related to shifts in the economy and business 
environment. However, developed markets may react differently compared to undeveloped 
markets when rating changes occur. 
Afonso (2003) established that the determinants for changes in credit ratings in both developed 
and developing countries are GDP and external debt. Montes et al. (2016) investigated what 
causes a change in credit ratings in 40 undeveloped countries. They observed that the SCRs of 
countries that focused on improving their unemployment rate, inflation rate, GDP growth rate and 
external debt then improved.  
Rowland (2004) examined 49 undeveloped countries to identify the factors which would determine 
the credit rating they would receive. He found that trade and financial openness, as well as, 
international reserves are the most important factors. Staats and Biglaiser (2012) observed that 
policy certainty, a less corrupt government and protection of property rights are important 
determinants of SCRs. 
 
2.8 REACTION OF DEVELOPED AND UNDEVELOPED MARKETS TO CREDIT RATING 
ANNOUNCEMENTS  
 
For both developed and developing countries the degree to which SCR announcements bridge 
the knowledge gap between investors and securities issuers is debatable. Credit ratings are 
important for investors in both developed and undeveloped countries to make investment 
decisions, as they require information about credit risk and the quality of borrowers (Elkhoury, 
2009). 
According to Ntsalaze, Boako and Alagidede (2017), less developed economies have higher 
borrowing cost following a rating downgrade when compared to developed countries. Therefore, 
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credit ratings are of more importance to developing countries than developed countries as they 
require these ratings to raise capital from the developed countries. 
In analysing the relationships between changes in SCRs issued by various rating agencies and 
changes in stock market returns, several empirical studies have provided conflicting findings 
(Griffin & Sanvicente, 1982; Holthausen & Leftwich, 1986). A major group of studies focused on 
stock market returns of credit rating announcements in both developing and developed countries. 
The findings of this extensive research are summarised below. 
 
2.8.1 STUDIES OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES  
 
2.8.1.1 NO EFFECT OF CHANGES 
 
Fama (1965) contributed to the theory of financial market efficiency. He indicated that markets 
are efficient as prices for shares adjust rapidly to new information. Fama (1970) reported that 
markets fully reflect all information available at any point in time. Institutions such as rating 
agencies which are established to provide financial markets with expert knowledge are therefore 
irrelevant. Fama (1970) also stated that economies are in equilibrium as stock prices accurately 
represent all available information at any point in time. Therefore, institutions such as CRAs that 
are set up to offer specialist advice to financial institutions are irrelevant, in his view. 
Among the first to research the impacts of the SCR was Weinstein (1977), who performed an 
event study using monthly US bond data from 1962 to 1974. He reported no substantial ARs. 
Pinches and Singleton (1978) examined data on monthly stock prices and also found no evidence 
of an upward or downward change in CARs before or after the rating announcements. 
Consequently, they concluded that the information content of the SCR study is too low to have a 
major effect on financial market prices. 
In line with previous studies, Goh and Ederington (1993) indicated that economic markets are 
efficient and that financial market investors are well-educated and accurately assess the quality 
of borrowers without the assistance of credit rating information. They maintain that ratings are 
irrelevant because all information is already included in prices and therefore there is no way to 
outperform the market because there are no undervalued or overvalued securities available. 
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Goh and Ederington (1999) applied an event study approach to Moody's rating changes for the 
period 1984 to 1990 to examine if downgrades triggered by weakening economic prospects had 
negative effects for both stockholders and bondholders. They demonstrated that the share market 
had no response to downgrades and a positive response to upgrades. 
Norden and Weber (2004) examined if financial markets are efficient following rating 
announcements made by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch between 2000 and 2002. Using an event study 
approach on 90 European, US and Asian businesses, they found that financial markets do not 
react to credit rating announcements. 
Pukthuanthong-Le, Elayan and Rose (2007) examined the effect of changes in sovereign ratings 
and outlooks on changes in stock prices by calculating a market model for an event study 
approach on a database of 34 countries covering emerging and developed regions from 1990 to 
2000. After a sovereign downgrade triggered by high inflation, poor fiscal balance, and high 
sovereign debt, they find substantial rises in the cost of capital. In addition, Pukthuanthong-Le et 
al. (2007), find the adjustment of share prices to sovereign rating actions occurs rapidly in an 
efficient market to disallow arbitrage opportunities. 
Additionally, Leonard (2013) used an event study methodology to evaluate the effects of 
downgrades on share prices using downgrades from the three big CRAs between 2001 and 2011. 
No statistically significant share market reactions following a downgrade rating were found. 
Leonard (2013) suggests that equity investors do not significantly respond to downgrade 
announcements as the risk is already reflected in the prices of the company's shares. 
Kenjegaliev, Duygun and Mamedshakhova (2016) maintain that share prices tend to adjust 
themselves long before a rating is announced. Their results support the notion that CRAs are 
sluggish when it comes to issuing a rating. They suggest that the information provided by CRAs 
is already available to the public and is absorbed by the market before the announcement date. 
 
2.8.1.2 EFFECT OF CHANGES 
 
Katz (1974) is one of the first to discover inefficiency in security markets by examining the semi-
strong efficiency hypothesis. In support of Katz (1974), Ederington et al. (1987) argue that rating 
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agencies are specialists in processing information relevant to the financial condition of the 
company at a low cost.  
A similar conclusion was reached by Wansley and Clauretie (1985) and Cornell, Landsman and 
Shapiro (1989), who agreed that downgrades have a significant effect on share prices, whereas 
upgrades do not influence share prices. 
The pervasive empirical finding seems to be that share prices respond negatively to downgrades, 
but there is no proof of a substantial reaction in the event of upgrades (Hand & Holthausen, 1992). 
Boot and Schmeits (2006) explain that only downgrades are informative occurrences. These 
arguments reflect the ideas of Ederington and Goh (1998), who claim that rating agencies spend 
more resources on deterioration rather than credit quality improvement.  
In the United Kingdom, Barron, Clare and Thomas (1997) established that rating agencies provide 
new information to capital markets and suggest that there are considerable ARs whenever a 
downgrade occurs.  
Reisen and Von Maltzan (1998) conducted an event study, taking a sample of US share markets 
to evaluate the efficiency of information between 1987 and 1996. Brooks, Faff, Hillier and Hillier 
(2004) also used the event analysis method on The MSCI World Index from 1973 to 2001 to 
assess the weak-form efficiency. Both studies concluded that financial markets are inefficient in 
the weak form and that public announcements such as credit ratings provide an independent 
evaluation of the creditworthiness of debt securities issued by governments and corporations, 
which reduces investors' ability to outperform each other by making better creditworthiness 
judgements. 
To further analyse the information value of credit ratings, an event study needs to be done. Hand 
and Holthausen (1992) were the first to use an event study to produce better empirical findings 
on the information quality of rating announcements. The sample for their study was based on S&P 
and Moody's announcements of changes in the rating of bonds, during the period 1977-1982. 
Their general conclusion was that the bond market responds significantly to the announcement 
of changes in ratings. 
22 
 
Steiner and Heinke (2001) also examined the price impact of rating announcements on the 
German Eurobond market. The key conclusions were that all downgrade announcements are 
significant on the day of the announcement. Upgrades, however, have insignificant effects. 
Steiner and Heinke (2001) suggest two reasons for this asymmetrical activity of downgrade and 
upgrade bond rates. Firstly, downgrades have more informational value because CRAs focus 
their research on discovering negative credit information. Secondly, investors place more 
importance on bad news than on good news (Steiner and Heinke, 2001). 
Later studies aimed at conducting more effective tests by researching 'daily' share price 
responses to new credit rating information (Holthausen & Leftwich, 1986). Overall, the evidence 
concedes that downgrades produced by S&P and Moody's result in negative ARs, whereas no 
favourable response is associated with upgrades.  
There was also some research on the market consequences of SCRs (Cantor & Packer, 1996). 
The analysis demonstrates the highly significant effect of rating announcements. In line with 
Cantor and Packer (1996), Elayan, Hsu and Meyer (2003) indicate that the New Zealand market 
displayed a significant reaction to downgrade and upgrade announcements. This suggests that 
international rating agencies assist in serving the market with new public information.  
A similar pattern of results was obtained by Choy, Gray and Ragunathan (2006) who investigated 
the informational content of credit ratings by focusing on upgrade and downgrade ratings. They 
found that only downgrades elicited a market reaction on Australian share price returns. A similar 
conclusion was reached by Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007) who indicated that CRAs provide new 
information to the market. They found that downgrades had the biggest impact on share price 
returns, compared to upgrades. This is consistent with what was observed by Creighton, Gower 
and Richards (2007), that CRAs influence both the equity and bond market prices on the Austrian 
market. 
In a different context, Behr and Güttler (2008) concentrated on the impacts of unsolicited credit 
ratings, i.e. scores not demanded or paid by the businesses. They discovered that changes in 
unsolicited ratings have a negative impact on the stock market regardless of how the rate change 
is moving. Their investigation analysed 86 unsolicited credit ratings taken from the period 1996 to 
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2005. The results indicate that there were significant ARs in the market following a credit rating 
downgrade. 
In addition, Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2009) also discovered that bond downgrades lead to significant 
share price losses on the announcement date. Research by Yi and Mullineaux (2006) offers 
further proof that only downgrades communicate information to investors. 
In an event study methodology for evaluating abnormal returns, Bissoondoyal-Bheenick and 
Brooks (2012) analyse the effect of sovereign rating announcements on stock market returns 
using all S&P rating announcements for the US, UK, France, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, 
Croatia, Austria and Norway for the period 1975 to 2010. They find statistically significant proof 
that an increase in capital costs is the product of SCR downgrade announcements. 
Kenjegaliev et al. (2016) used daily return data from the German stock market index and focused 
on ratings from the three major rating agencies, S&P, Fitch and Moody’s. They found that when 
a rating upgrade occurred, there was no reaction from the share prices. Their research indicated 
a significant movement in share prices after a downgrade rating.  
Equally, Miyamoto (2016) examined what effect credit rating announcements had on Japanese 
companies and found that the market reacted positively with a downgrade announcement. 
Similarly, Reisen and Von Maltzan (1999) found that Asian countries experienced an inflow of 
capital after the announcement of a rating upgrade. 
In summary, CRAs serve an important role in providing information on the efficiency of the 
financial market, thereby reducing uncertainty which improves investor confidence in a financial 
economy. However, the effects of credit rating announcements on the efficiency of financial 
markets in developing countries are inconclusive.  
 
2.8.2 STUDIES OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
In comparison to the studies discussed above, the majority of the literature on developing 
countries indicates that financial markets are inefficient and that institutions such as CRAs have 
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information that is not accessible in the public domain. As a result, creditors focus mainly on credit 
rating announcements to make investment decisions. 
Emerging markets are different from developed nations as they offer investors higher returns due 
to their higher risk (Buckberg, 1995). Ratings are also important for the market as they act as a 
summary of a country’s economic, political and financial situation, thus helping to attract capital 
inflow. 
Emerging markets are severely affected by corruption, political risk and lack of transparency of 
the government, which can hold back the development and growth of a country (Kim & Wu, 2008). 
The demand for investment within an emerging market usually increases through an improved 
SCR, which indicates protection of investment to an investor (Rajan & Zingales, 2003). 
Over the past decade, the issuing of credit ratings has become important for emerging markets 
as they require more global funding to develop their markets (Gibley, 2012). Gibley (2012) 
maintains that emerging market countries differ from developed countries, as they do not have 
the same economic and political stability as developed countries. He also states that emerging 
markets are manifesting to become bigger players on a global scale. 
Christopher, Kim and Wu (2012) investigated the effect of SCR announcements on emerging 
markets’ share and bond price movements using the period between 1994 and 2007. They found 
that when sovereign outlooks and ratings are revised negatively or downgraded, the investment 
in a country decreases. 
Kim and Wu (2008) examined the effects of credit ratings on 51 emerging markets to find that 
foreign direct investment improves a country’s SCR. In a sample of nine emerging market 
economies (Bulgaria, Latvia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia) over the period 1998 to 2007, Mateev (2012) examines evidence of abnormal returns 
during SCR announcements using an event study methodology. He reports that bond yield 
spreads display positive abnormal returns, while shares in response to a country's downgrade 
show negative abnormal returns. Mateev (2012), on the other hand, does not find statistically 




Williams et al. (2015) investigated the effect of rating changes on emerging markets, using from 
rating agencies Moody’s, Fitch and S&P. They considered the share prices of 277 banks across 
19 emerging markets and found that positive and negative changes in ratings had a strong impact 
on the different banks’ valuations. Their investigation identified a link between emerging markets’ 
credit ratings and the share price of banks. They established that a downgrade by S&P and 
Moody’s resulted in a decrease in banks’ share prices, but a downgrade announcement by Fitch 
had no impact on the banks’ share prices. 
 
These studies indicate that most emerging countries financial markets are inefficient.  
 
2.9 SOVEREIGN CREDIT RATING STUDIES VS CORPORATE RATINGS 
 
A corporate credit rating reflects the CRA’s opinion of a company’s ability to satisfy its debt 
obligations (Galil, 2003). Credit ratings, known as SCRs, are assigned to countries and act as a 
benchmark for companies within that country (Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2005). SCRs indicate to 
investors the level of risk they will be taking on for investing in a particular country.  
Governments try to receive the best possible SCR as this reduces the difficulty of accessing 
capital inflow from international markets; investors would rather invest in countries with good 
ratings than in countries that are risky (Cantor & Packer, 1996). Banks are particularly affected 
by this information as the SCR affects the interest rates of a country, thus impacting banks’ 
financing conditions (Gande & Parsley, 2005; Borensztein, Cowan & Valenzuela, 2007). 
SCRs are affected mainly by two types of risk, namely economic and political risk. Economic risk 
is explained by Kräussl (2003) as the risk that the government will not pay back its debt when it 
falls due. Political risk refers to the possibility that a political decision will negatively impact 
international investment (Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, & Siegel, 2014).  
In general, the literature about SCR changes indicates that there is an impact on financial markets. 
The relationship between corporate rating and SCRs needs to be examined to determine the 
impact that a change in rating has on the banks in emerging markets. There is a scarcity of 
existing literature focusing on the impact of SCRs in BRICS banks. Thus this study aimed to add 
to the literature.  
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The access to ratings is particularly important for market participants to guide and assist with 
making investment decisions (Pukthuanthong-Le et al., 2007). The question is then whether 
SCRs influence stock market movement directly or whether it is an independent variable among 
other factors that cause investors to change their portfolios. 
There are conflicting views when it comes to SCRs. Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007) insist that 
SCRs do, in fact, add new information to the market and that both downgrades and outlooks affect 
the equity and bond market. They also assert that an upgrade causes an increase in economic 
growth. Richards and Deddouche (1999) report that emerging market banks are not affected by 
SCR changes.  
Even though the informational effects of ratings have been studied quite extensively, more 
understanding is still needed regarding their impact on the information content of SCRs in banks. 
 
2.10 IMPACT OF SOVEREIGN RATING CHANGES ON BANKS  
 
Globalisation has increased the flow of capital all over the globe. This has caused a global 
demand for credit ratings, especially by investors who want to diversify their portfolios 
(Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2005). 
Suarez, Correa, Lee and Sapriza (2012) investigated the impact of SCR announcements on 
banks. Their sample consisted of 37 countries over the period 1995 to 2011. They found 
significant effects on banks following an SCR downgrade announcement.  
Williams et al. (2013) examined the effect SCRs have on banks from 1999 to 2009. Their research 
included 54 countries and they considered ratings from the three major rating agencies. They 
found that SCR downgrades had a significant effect on banks’ credit ratings but the impact of 
outlooks was insignificant. 
Caselli, Gandolfi and Soana (2016) demonstrated that SCR downgrades had negative 
repercussions for equity funding and increased the cost of funding debt, which led to downgrades 
of banks. They concluded that upgrades do not affect the banks’ share prices, but that 






As indicated in the literature reviewed above, there has been extensive research on the history 
and popularity of credit ratings. Although there has been a considerable amount of research on 
the effects of credit ratings, research has still to be conducted on the BRICS countries. This study 
attempts to fill this gap in knowledge. 
The literature on the effect of SCR announcements and the role of credit ratings in addressing 
information asymmetry is still inconclusive. In addition, to date, there has been no research on 
BRICS emerging markets. Therefore, it is proposed that if SCRs are valuable for investors, then 
they will adjust their portfolios after these announcements. In addition, if SCR announcements 
affect financial markets, CRAs could contribute to financial market stability in emerging countries. 
Thus, the role of credit ratings in determining market efficiency remains an area of ongoing debate 










An overall view of the data and methodology for addressing the research problem in this study is 
given in this chapter. First, a description is given of the problem statement and research question, 
followed by information concerning the theoretical framework and development of the hypothesis. 
The research methodology section deals with the research paradigm and research design 
selected to address the problem and fulfil the objectives of this study. In addition, the different 
stages of research are described, which include the method of data collection and data analysis. 
Finally, this chapter concludes with a discussion of validity and reliability in quantitative research 
and how these two requirements have been met in this study. 
 
The purpose of this study was to determine the extent to which credit rating announcements 
impact the daily share prices of banks in emerging market countries, namely Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa. To achieve the objective, the credit rating announcements from the three 
leading rating agencies were investigated to determine their impact on the daily share prices of 
the largest banks in the five emerging market countries, during the period 1 January 2010 to 31 
December 2017. 
 
3.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT  
 
The problem deals with the lack of research on the impact of SCR announcements on bank share 
prices in BRICS countries. This study distinguishes itself from others by examining the emerging 
market countries. Therefore, this study provides investors with a view of the effects within the 
BRICS countries. 
Emerging market countries are undeveloped and suffer from information asymmetry (De Wet, 
2004). For example, Seyhun (1998) explains the problem among lenders and borrowers is that 
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one party has more information than the other. This is known as information asymmetry. This 
occurs when the lender is less familiar with the conditions the borrower faces when entering into 
a contract. The lender of capital could make a different choice if they knew the information the 
borrower had withheld. Put in another way, if the lender of capital is aware of the borrower’s ability 
to pay back the borrowed capital, the lender might not lend the capital if they feel the borrower is 
too risky (Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
For this reason, this research investigated if CRAs can reduce the impact of asymmetric 
information by determining if both the borrowers and lenders have the same information so that 
both sides are fully aware of all the associated risks before entering into a transaction. The above 
problem statement is explored through the following research question. 
 
3.3 RESEARCH QUESTION  
 
Specific questions must be identified before data collection begins (Baskarada, 2014). Rating 
downgrades have been discovered to be informative compared to upgrades, which are not 
(Ferreira & Gama, 2007). The studies conducted to date have provided conflicting findings, 
presenting uncertain evidence that rating announcements have an impact on share prices (Cantor 
& Packer, 1996; Williams et al. 2013). Due to the mixed evidence of the informational importance 
of credit ratings, the importance of rating news is still highly debated in emerging markets. 
Investment managers face the need for more accurate country risk information on how an SCR 
announcement can impact their portfolios. Since sovereign ratings function as a risk indicator of 
a countries credit risk, it is also important to have an understanding of the effect that credit rating 
announcements have on share prices (Hooper, Hume & Kim, 2008).  
Given these points, the mixed evidence and growing importance of credit ratings led to the 
development of the research question: 
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Do credit rating announcements generate any additional information for emerging market 
banks? 
The theoretical framework guides to make sense of what theory would help answer the research 
question. 
 
3.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
This research is grounded on the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) theory. EMH describes 
markets as efficient, which means share prices reflect all significant information (Fama, 1965). 
EMH means that share prices always trade at its fair value, making it impossible for investors to 
outperform the market (Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll, 1969). 
EMH explains how effective the market is. It makes a primary assumption that share prices follow 
a random walk, in other words, information on the public market is fully reflected in the share price 
and investors cannot make excess profits to beat the market (Fama, 1965). According to Fama 
(1970:383), an efficient market is a market in which ‘prices always fully reflect available 
information’. This means that investors should all have the same data, and when a credit rating 
change is announced, there should be no movement in the share price of a company. Fama 
(1970) indicates that the price of a share at a particular point in time mirrors all the private and 
public information available. He identifies three forms of efficiency: 
(i) Weak-form efficiency: Past price movements cannot predict the future direction of 
share prices. Neither can investors create excess returns through fundamental or 
technical analysis. 
(ii) Semi-strong market efficiency: Public information is already reflected in share 
prices. 
(iii) Strong-form market efficiency: The share prices reflect all public and private 
company information.  
 
This research tested only the semi strong form of EMH. The strong form states that all public and 
private information is fully and immediately factored into share prices and no investor can gain a 
market advantage (Degutis & Novickytė, 2014). 
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The investigation entailed determining whether banks in emerging markets are semi strong-form 
efficient as per EMH theory or not. To test the relationship between credit rating announcements 
and banks’ share prices, a hypothesis was used. 
A hypothesis is a testable proposition that predicts the relationship between two variables (Kothari 
& Warner, 2004). It is an idea that can prove to be true or incorrect by valid and reliable data 
(Kothari & Warner, 2004). The hypothesis developed for this study assisted in testing whether 
credit rating announcements affect the share prices of banks within emerging markets.  
There are varying views about the importance of credit rating announcements. The first is that 
share prices do not react to credit rating announcements (Linciano, 2004). The second view is 
that credit rating announcements have a significant impact on share prices (Venkatraman, 2015). 
This is because credit rating announcements add new information to the market as they include 
both information that is available to the public (company financial statements) and information 
that is not readily available to the public (sensitive information about the internal business) (Choy 
et al., 2006). These mixed views gave rise to the following hypothesis: 
 
TABLE 3.1: HYPOTHESIS 
H0: Hypothesis 1 
(Null): 
Banks’ share prices do not react to credit rating 
announcements. 
H1: Hypothesis 1 
(Alternative): 
Banks’ share prices do react to credit rating 
announcements. 
 
An assumption regarding the market efficiency of banks in emerging markets can be made by 
accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis. Such an assumption is formed by analysing the extent 
to which banks incorporate credit rating information into the share price. 
So far this chapter has focused on the problem, the research question, the theoretical framework 
and the hypothesis. The framework of beliefs, values and methods within which research takes 




3.5 RESEARCH PARADIGM 
 
Kuhn (1962) used the word "paradigm" to describe a conceptual framework that offers a useful 
model for problem solving. The term “paradigm” refers to a set of assumptions, beliefs and values 
that researchers follow when conducting research (Kuhn, 1977). Research paradigms represent 
the views about the researcher’s beliefs and principles (Lather, 1986). According to Kivunja and 
Kuyini (2017), the paradigm gives a way of obtaining information, answering study questions, 
understanding the issue and helping to solve it.  
 
Mukherji and Albon, (2015, p. 24) further suggests that a study is underpinned by a paradigm, or 
a particular way of "seeing the world and making sense of it".  Each researcher has a clear 
understanding of what knowledge and truth are (Chilisa & Kawulich, 2012). Paradigm therefore 
has important “consequences for every decision made in the research process” (Kivunja & Kuyini, 
2017, p. 26). Positivism represents that "truth is possible to discover" (Mukherji & Albon, 2015, p. 
24). This is because human behaviour is predictable, induced and subject to both internal 
influences and external factors (Hitchcock & Hughes, 1995). 
 
It has been demonstrated that paradigms can help the researcher take different approaches to 
the research because it allows the problem to be seen from different perspectives. The purpose 
of this study was to create a better understanding of whether or not market participants are fully 
aware of the informational value of CRAs in emerging market countries. The effect of credit rating 
announcements on the banks of emerging market countries was therefore studied. This focus led 
to the adoption of a positivist stance. Walsham (1995) states that true knowledge can be acquired 
through observation and experimentation. Positivistic thinkers adopt scientific methods to uncover 
the truth and present it by empirical means (Henning, Van Rensburg & Smit, 2004:17). This 
strategy was chosen because research is verifiable and based on observation and evaluation. 
The positivist approach was adopted in this study for the following reasons: 
 Quantitative data collection methods were applied and a hypothesis was created to test 
statistically whether something is true or not. 
 The researcher believed it was possible to determine and quantify the results. 
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 The way the researcher learns the truth about something is to use hard data to carry out 
empirical tests that are independent of the researcher’s own emotions and interests while 
identifying the connection between two variables and understanding it. 
 Reality is independent of the researcher’s interests, and it is measurable when broken 
down into variables. 
Positivist researchers use quantitative data to answer the research question and use experiments 
to test the relationship between variables (Eyisi, 2016). This positivist paradigm led to an 
experimental research design to logically and effectively address the research hypothesis. 
 
3.6 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The research design is a plan for answering the research question (Hakim, 2000). This research 
followed an experimental research design as it investigated the extent to which credit rating 
announcements impact the daily share prices of banks in emerging market countries.  
 
Experimental research is a scientific approach to research in which one or more independent 
variables are manipulated and implemented in order to test their effect on one or more dependent 
variables (Ross & Morrison, 2004). In order to help researchers, draw a conclusion about the 
relationship between these two variable types, the influence of the independent variables on the 
dependent variables is typically observed and reported for some time (Ross & Morrison, 2004). 
 
3.6.1 RATIONALE FOR EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Experimental research design is concerned with finding a link between two variables (Hakim, 
2000). Experimental design tests if a change in one variable affects the other variable (Smith & 
Heshusius, 1986). 
 The experimental research design is the most appropriate way to draw conclusions about 
the relationship between variables and to determine if one or more factors cause a change 
in an outcome or not (Smith & Heshusius, 1986). 
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 The experimental research design is repeatable, so it is possible to check and verify 
outcomes (Smith & Heshusius, 1986). 
A particular set of variables is required to perform an experimental study. Before the information 
collection can start, it is essential to consider all relevant variables. 
 
3.6.2 VARIABLES MEASURED 
 
The experimental approach is used to test the relationship between two variables (Kothari & 
Warner, 2004).  The main aim of implementing an experimental study is to identify any link 
between variables that relate to the research problem. Kothari and Warner (2004) explain that an 
experimental strategy is appropriate to test the effects of an independent variable (in this case, 
credit rating announcements) on a dependent variable (in this case, the share price of banks). 
The experimental approach requires collecting, summarising, analysing and interpreting 
numerical data (Kothari & Warner, 2004).  
 
An experimental research design is typically associated with a deductive research method 
(Soiferman, 2010). The deductive method is aimed at testing the independent and dependent 
variables. 
 
3.6.3 DEDUCTIVE REASONING 
 
The deductive method was selected for this study because it concerns the development of a 
hypothesis based on existing literature and the subsequent development of a research strategy 
to address the hypothesis (Silzle & Ung, 2017). This approach was used to test the hypothesis 
stated in Figure 3.1. A hypothesis is derived from existing theory in deductive studies and then 







FIGURE 3.1: THE RESEARCH APPROACH  
Source: Author 
 
This approach guided the data collection methods used in this study and yielded valuable data 
about the problem. Quantitative research assessment is a deductive approach that uses 
standardised information collection methods (Meadows, 2003). One of the fundamental 
techniques of quantitative research is experimental research. Stake (1995) states that quantitative 
research is deductive. 
 
3.6.4 QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Quantitative elements were used to determine the effect credit rating announcements have on 
bank share prices within emerging markets. Quantitative research relates to techniques of study, 
i.e. how information is gathered and analysed, and the type of generalisations and representations 
extracted from the data. It presents statistical results represented by numerical or statistical data 
Malhotra (2007). Malhotra (2007) describes the quantitative study technique as ‘a study technique 
that aims to quantify the information and typically applies some type of statistical assessment’. 
Quantitative data was adopted in this study for the following reasons: 
 It is the ideal research design to test a hypothesis (Cavana, Delahaye & Sekeran, 2001).  
 The objective of undertaking a quantitative study is to determine the relationship between 
one thing and another within a population (Cavana, et al., 2001).  
 The findings produced will be highly accurate as information is gathered, analysed and 
presented in numbers (Cavana, et al., 2001). 
 This study technique does not provide any scope for personal comments or bias. The 
results obtained are numerical and fair (Cavana, et al., 2001). 
Positivist research is most commonly associated with quantitative data collection and analysis 
methods (Mackenzie & Knipe, 2006). Cavana et al. (2001) argue that the relationship between 
the variables should be found in a valid manner; researchers should develop a planned data 
collection and interpretation procedure. 
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3.7 DATA COLLECTION 
 
The researcher collects data to address the research problem. The task of data collection begins 
after a research problem and research design have been defined. Mesly (2015) describes two 
types of data: primary data and secondary data. Primary data is collected and analysed for the 
first time. Secondary data has already been gathered and the statistical process carried out by 
someone else. Primary data was used in this study. Before collecting any data, it is important for 




The target population refers to the events or the entire group of people that the researcher wishes 
to investigate (Burns & Grove, 1993:779). The target population in this study comprised all 
sovereign credit rating announcements from the three CRAs, namely Moody’s, S&P and Fitch, 
which dominate the credit rating industry. The closing prices of the publicly listed banks of the 
emerging market countries, namely Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, were used. The 
reason for using emerging market banks was that to the researcher’s knowledge, no previous 
studies have focused on the effects of BRICS banks following a credit rating announcement. The 
period ranged from 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2017. Only long-term debt and country 




A sample is a subgroup of the population and comprises a selection of members from the 
population (Cavana et al., 2001). A sample is chosen from the population because it can provide 
a more concentrated description of the population (Crabtree & Miller, 1992). 
A search was conducted using the Bloomberg database to obtain all credit rating information while 
ensuring that no single credit rating notification was left out. Bloomberg provides a wide range of 
financial data worldwide. For the period 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2017, 83 credit rating 
announcements were gathered. The dataset consisted of 23 banks, which comprised three banks 
from Brazil, three banks from Russia, four from China, five from South Africa and eight from India. 
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The banks chosen are the top banks of the emerging markets and this was enough to capture the 
full effect on the economy should there be a rating announcement.  The banks chosen were based 
on their market capital (size) so that there was confidence that the shares were actively traded on 
the market and to capture the full effect on the economy should there be a rating announcement.  
The analysis covered a sample of 50 emerging market banks that had ratings as at December 
2017; these included the top 10 banks from each emerging country. However, of the 50 banks 
that had sovereign ratings, 37 had no functional value, as their market value was too small when 
compared to the banks with the largest market capitalisation.  The banks surveyed included Itaú 
Unibanco, Banco do Brasil and Banco Bradesco of Brazil; Sberbank, VTB Bank and 
Gazprombank of Russia; State Bank of India, Bank of Baroda, ICICI Bank, Punjab National Bank, 
HDFC Bank Ltd, Canara Bank, City Union Bank of India and Axis Bank Ltd of India; China 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank Corporation, China 
Agricultural Bank of China, China Bank of China and ACGBY US Equity of China; Capitec, 
Standard Bank, Nedbank, Barclays and First Rand of South Africa. Banks that did not have ratings 
were excluded. 
Stock exchanges were included in the sample as they have the active banks. The movements in 
share prices capture the impact of an announcement on the share market, thus the share index 
in each country was used to estimate the market returns over the sample period. These 
exchanges include BOVESPA (Brazil), MICEX (Russia), SENSEX (India), SSE Index (China) and 
ALSI (South Africa). 
Ratings focused on long-term country-specific ratings. This means that the rating agencies issued 
an opinion on the general overall ability of the countries to meet their financial commitments in 
the long term. The long-term issuer ratings reveal the full effect of the rating change on the 






FIGURE 3.2: FREQUENCY OF CREDIT RATINGS FROM 2010 TO 2017 
Source: Primary Data 
The highest number of ratings, were issued in 2015. The Russian economy contracted for the first 
time in five years in 2015, after economists cautioned that if oil prices kept dropping, the country 
faced an outright recession (Treanor, 2015). Since falling metal prices, energy shortages and low 
global demand have stifled production, both S&P and Fitch have downgraded South Africa's credit 
rating in 2015 (Hogg, 2015). Because of the extreme instability of the Brazilian economy, 
S&P downgraded Brazil's sovereign debt, with unemployment being the highest in decades. The 
spike in downgrades are a result of general market malaise (Associated Press, 2015). 
The dataset consisted of 83 credit rating announcements within the period 2010 to 2017 from the 
three major CRAs. Of the 83, 24 were downgrade ratings and six were upgrade ratings and 53 












2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
FREQUENCY OF CREDIT RATINGS
39 
 
3.7.3 DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE 
 
After selecting the relevant population and sample, a data collection procedure followed. Data 
collection is the process of gathering and systematically measuring data to answer the hypothesis. 
Quantitative data was used to determine the effect of credit rating announcements on daily share 
prices of banks. 
Using the Bloomberg database, all the share prices of the listed banks, as well as the share prices 
of the stock exchange for each of the emerging market countries, were extracted.  After cleaning 
the data and removing the banks which were excluded from the sample because their market 
capital (size) was too small, 23 banks were analysed. 
The hypothesis tested the ARs and CARs for significance. The CAR was formulated from two key 
pieces of data, namely the closing share prices of banks and the closing share price of the index. 
The indices chosen for each country were the all-share indices. The all-share indices were chosen 
as they contained the shares of the banks chosen in this sample and served as a good proxy for 
comparing the expected returns. 
The closing daily prices from the banks’ shares and indices were extracted from the Bloomberg 
database. The daily data explains in an isolated fashion whether an abnormality of returns occurs. 
For each bank, the daily returns were calculated using the closing price of the day, at 24:00, in 
USD currency. 
Next, the credit rating announcements were needed to test the hypothesis. The rating agencies 
that were chosen needed to rate all five emerging market countries and be recognised by each 
of the countries’ exchange commissions. The chosen rating agencies were Moody’s, S&P and 
Fitch. The credit rating was extracted from the Bloomberg database and cross-checked against 
trading economics to confirm credibility and reputation. 
Ratings are denoted by alphabets and move on a scale from A, B, C to D. The highest rating 
obtainable is AAA and as the rating descends to D, the probability of default becomes higher. 
Countries which are rated above BBB are considered to be within investment grade and those 
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below BBB are said to be non-investment grade. Fitch and S&P have adopted (+/-) signs which 
signal to the market the outlook that the agency foresees for the country’s rating in the future. 
The data analysis is described by Shamoo and Resnik (2003) as a method that can bring order, 
structure and significance to the collected data. 
 
3.8 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Data analysis is the method of systematically implementing statistical and/or logical methods for 
describing, illustrating and evaluating data (Shamoo & Resnik, 2003). A traditional time series 
event study was used to test the effects of changes in credit rating announcements on the banks’ 
closing share prices, similar to that used by Freitas and Minardi (2013) and Abdeldayem and 
Nekhili (2016).  
This event study measured the effect of an event (credit rating announcement) to determine the 
reaction from the share price near to the announcement date (Brown & Warner, 1980).  Fama et 
al. (1969) first implemented this approach in a study where the speeds of price adjustments to 
new information were tested.  
An event study is a statistical method used to determine an event's effect on stock prices. Event 
studies are a popular method in finance research for analysing returns. An event study is the most 
effective analytical methodology for isolating the effect of the stock price details (Kothari & 
Warner, 2004). It captures a certain moment of interest to be analysed. The main concept of an 
event study is to find the AR around the event date. The AR during the event date is compared to 






3.8.1 UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
 
To perform an event study there must be a clear indication of the unit of analysis, being the ‘event’. 
The event in this study is a credit rating announcement made by the three rating agencies 
(Moody’s, Fitch and S&P) for banks listed on the stock exchange of emerging markets between 
the period 1 January 2010 and 31 December 2017. 
For each of the five emerging market countries, a credit rating announcement is issued on a 
specific date. Each rating agency issues a rating for the emerging market countries they wish to 
rate (via unsolicited ratings).  
Each credit rating has particular, distinct features. First, when a credit rating is issued to a country, 
it either can remain unchanged, or be downgraded/upgraded. The second characteristic is a credit 
rating outlook, typically indicating a rating that can be increased in future. A rating outlook that is 
issued to a country can be a positive outlook, which could serve as an indication that a country’s 
credit rating may be upgraded in the future, or it can be a negative outlook, which could serve as 
an indication that a country’s credit rating may be downgraded in the future. 
 
3.8.2 TIME HORIZON 
 
It is essential to follow the key measures of an event study to conduct the event study, namely (i) 





3.8.2.1 EVENT DATE 
 
The event date selected was the day the SCR announcement reaches the market for the first 
time. In the event model, the selected event date was the credit rating announcement date. This 
data have been described in the event model as the time period '0' (T0). 
 
3.8.2.2 EVENT WINDOW 
 
The event window is the period over which the ARs were calculated. This is a period around the 
event date. The event window of 10 days before and 10 days after was chosen to identify if there 
were significant returns around the announcement date, which could indicate leaking of 
information (Holthausen & Leftwich, 1986).  
Increasing the length of the event window will make the results less convincing since they can be 
affected by other factors and noise not related to the event (Holthausen & Leftwich, 1986). Thus, 
a short-term event window was used to eliminate any confounding events that may have affected 
the banks’ share price. This study did not investigate a long event window post the announcement 
date as shorter estimation periods are more reliable about the returns generated (Eckbo, Masulis, 
& Norli, 2007). 
While the event window measured the impact of the event around the announcement date, the 
estimation window was used to calculate the normal returns, which are generally well in advance 
of the announcement date. 
 
3.8.2.3 ESTIMATION WINDOW 
 
The estimation period was used to calculate the normal returns and was used as a benchmark. 
The normal returns serve as the expected returns in the absence of the event. To prevent bias 
due to a short estimation period relative to the event window, an estimation period of 100 days 
was chosen. Using this method, only a small bias remained in the uncorrected test statistic 
(Distler, 2017). The duration of this estimation period was long enough to make a good estimate 
of the normal returns based on the literature of Distler (2017).  
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An estimation window of 100 days was not too wide as it also lessened other stock market noise 
that may have contaminated the impact that the change in rating had on the banks’ shares 
(Holthausen & Leftwich, 1986). The estimation window was used to calculate the intercept, slope, 
standard error and R-square. Figure 3.2 below represents the estimation window and event 
window around the event day. 
 
FIGURE 3.3: TIME WINDOW 
Source: Author 
 
The release dates of these events were verified on Bloomberg as well as on the rating agencies’ 
websites of Moody’s, S&P and Fitch to ensure that the event date was correct. It could have had 
a confounding impact on the share price if the release date was not consistent.  
The paradigm and type of study, as well as research questions and hypothesis, guided the 





An event study was used to determine the effect of credit rating announcements on the share 




3.8.3.1 CALCULATING NORMAL RETURNS 
 
To calculate the normal returns, the returns of the benchmark 100 days before the SCR 
announcement date had to be calculated. The benchmark was different for every country and was 
determined by the country where the announcement was made. For example, if the 
announcement was in South Africa, the benchmark was the All-Share Stock Index (ALSI). 
To calculate the normal returns, the market model was calculated using the geometric return 
formula. It is a widely used model in the analysis of events (MacKinlay, 1997). In comparison, the 
market model provides a reasonable estimate of the normal returns for event studies (Brown & 
Warner, 1985). 




          (1) 
Where: 
, 	 = Market return of the share during point t 
,  = Closing price of the market during point t 
, =where Closing price of the market the day before point t 
 
The equation for the market model (CAPM) is as follows: 
	 ,          (2) 
Where: 
	= Expected return from share i during time t 
	= Risk-free rate 
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	= Sensitivity of share i on market return 
, 	= Market risk premium 
 
3.8.3.2 CALCULATING ABNORMAL RETURNS (ARs) 
 
In this study, an event study was calculated around every announcement event. The actual 
returns around the announcement date were compared with the normal returns to determine the 
ARs.  
The first step in calculating the ARs is calculating a daily return. The ARs were calculated by 
taking the returns on the event date of the banks’ shares minus the normal returns of the country 
index calculated over the event window. 
The formula for the abnormal return is: 
          (3) 
Where: 
 =  Abnormal return of the share during point t 
 =  Actual return of the share during point t 
 Expected return during point t 
 
If there were any effects on the banks’ share prices following a credit rating announcement, then 
the ARs were significant at the 5% level.  
To determine if the ARs were significant, the t-statistics results were compared to the confidence 
intervals below: 
 If the t-stat test was negative, it means investors reacted negatively to the announcement. 
 If the t-stat test was positive, it means investors reacted positively to the announcement. 
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 If the t-stat results were < or > 1.98, then according to the abnormal distribution curve, 
there was a 95% chance that credit rating announcements affected the banks’ share 
prices. 
 
The actual return (rt) on each banks share is calculated using the geometric return formula: 
	            (4) 
Where: 
	 =  Actual return of the share during point t 
 = Closing price of the share during point t 
 = Closing price of the share the day before point t 
 
3.8.3.3 DETERMINING THE CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS (CARS) 
 
The ARs were calculated daily. The CARs were calculated by summing the daily ARs since the 
start of the observation window. 
If there are no ARs on the event date itself, it was considered necessary to calculate the CARs. 
CARs are used to assess the aggregate effect of the ARs. The CAR formula was used to 
demonstrate the average returns the banks lost or gained over a period. The ARs were then 
gathered and calculated over a period to calculate a CAR. The CAR was used to measure the 
effect of credit rating announcements on the banks’ share prices over a period. Hertel (2013) also 
used this formula to identify the effect of credit rating announcements on the electric utility 
industry. 
To demonstrate the effect an actual event had on the share prices, the CAR formula was used.  
The calculation of CAR is as follows: 
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	 ∑ ,           (5) 
Where: 
 = Cumulative abnormal return at time t 
,  = Abnormal return from bank i at time t 
If there were any effects on the banks’ share prices following a credit rating announcement, then 
the CARs were significant at the 5% level. 
To determine if the CARs were significant, the t-statistics results were compared to the confidence 
intervals below: 
 If the t-stat test was negative, it means investors reacted negatively to the announcement. 
 If the t-stat test was positive, it means investors reacted positively to the announcement. 
 If the t-stat results were < or > 1.98, then according to the abnormal distribution curve, 
there was a 95% chance that credit rating announcements affected the banks’ share 
prices. 
 
3.8.4 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS  
 
Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) maintain that it is important to use a test statistic to investigate 
if a given event has any significant effect on the returns of share prices within an event window. 
 
Test for significance 
 
Having determined the CARs, normal returns and ARs over time, the next step was to test for 
significance.  
A t-test was performed to test the significance of the event on the emerging market banks. A t-
test is calculated to determine whether the sample returns differ significantly from the expected 




The greater the magnitude of the t-statistics (positive or negative), the greater the evidence that 
a credit rating announcement has significant effects; the nearer the t-statistics is to 0, the greater 
the likelihood that no significant effect was seen. 
The study used t-statistics to test if ARs and CARs were significantly close to 0 or not.  
	 ,
√
         (6) 
	 ,
√
         (7) 
Where: 
 = Abnormal return from bank i of time t 
,  = Standard deviation of abnormal returns 
√  = Square root of the number of events 
A significance level of 5% was used to weigh the t-values to evaluate the significance of the 
results. 
To determine if the t-statistics were significant, the results were compared to the confidence 
intervals below: 
 If the t-stat test was negative, it means investors reacted negatively to the announcement. 
 If the t-stat test was positive, it means investors reacted positively to the announcement. 
 If the t-stat results were < or > 1.98, then according to the abnormal distribution curve, 







3.9 DATA VALIDITY 
 
According to Saunders and Lewis (2012), data validity relates to the extent to which the data 
collected accurately measures what they were intended to measure. 
 
To control for the contamination of data, the key factors below were considered. 
 
3.9.1 SUBJECT SELECTION 
 
To avoid collecting data which were not useful for achieving this study’s objectives, the data were 




To control for any other events which could contaminate the dataset on the event date, the study 
by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) was followed where they assumed that there were no events 
that caused a bias to the dataset. This means that other factors affected share prices either in a 
negative or positive random way. 
 
Using an event window, the effect of a ‘rare occurrence’, such as mergers and acquisitions or 
new listings of shares, was countered. This study was only concerned with the date that the 
announcement was made public. It was expected that if an event was serially correlated, the study 
would be biased. Only clean events for this study were chosen and an event window of only 10 




To eliminate the ambiguity surrounding the correctness of the data provided relating to the credit 
ratings, the data collected from the Bloomberg database were compared to another database 
known as Trading Economics (Trading economics, 2018). This eliminated any ambiguity 




3.10 DATA RELIABILITY 
 
According to Saunders and Lewis (2012), data reliability refers to the extent to which the data 
collection methodology and data analysis will provide consistent findings. Data were collected 
from one reliable source to ensure that the findings were consistent. To avoid any changes in the 
data collected about credit rating announcements, the data were stored without undergoing any 
changes. The credit rating announcements collected of Bloomberg were also cross-referenced 
against Trading Economics for completeness.  
 
Timmermans (2012) indicates that share prices generally do not satisfy the normality assumption, 
because the share price series data have fat-tailed distributions. In event studies, if N is greater 




This chapter outlined the methodology applied to test the effects of credit rating announcements 
on the banks of emerging countries. Through this methodology, this study provided clear insight 
into the information content that credit ratings have. The results of this study will be helpful to 
investors, who will be able to use the results information from this study in their investment 
decisions. The aim is to contribute to investment finance literature and to provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of how these rating agencies affect the stocks of banks. 
The research methodology entailed a quantitative research design and population of 23 banks. 
An event study methodology tested the significance of credit rating announcements on banks’ 
share prices.  
The following chapter contains a description of the data chosen in this study and the empirical 









The previous chapter outlined the methodology adopted for the present investigation. This chapter 
presents the statistical analysis of the data and the interpretation of the results. A quantitative, 
experimental design was used to collect data from the Bloomberg database. After the data were 
collected, they were analysed and the results obtained. The results obtained are presented and 
interpreted in the form of graphs and tables, to identify trends and relationships in accordance 
with the aims of this research. The aim of this investigation was to investigate the impact of 
sovereign credit rating (SCR) announcements on the daily share prices of banks in emerging 
countries. 
The empirical investigation revealed that both ARs (Tables 4.1 and 4.2) and CARs (Figures 4.1 
and 4.2) exhibited insignificant returns under the event study market model. This implies that SCR 
announcements (upgrade, downgrade, positive outlook and negative outlook) do not have 
informational value. Thus, the results indicate that the hypothesis that banks’ share prices do 
react to SCR announcements can be rejected. 
Sections 4.2 to and 4.4 give a brief description of the analysis and interpretation of the data.  The 
results and descriptive statistics surrounding announcement effects are presented in Sections 4.5 
to 4.8. Limitations of the study are highlighted in Section 4.9 and the last Section (Section 4.10) 
is the summary of the chapter. 
 
4.2 DATA  
 
The data used in this research were mainly SCR announcements, bank share price data and 
stock index returns. For the period 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2017, 83 SCR 
announcements were examined using the Bloomberg database. Of the 83, 24 were downgrade 
52 
 
ratings and six were upgrade ratings. There were 53 outlook changes, 45 of which were negative 
and eight were positive. The number of BRICS countries receiving SCR from the three major 




FIGURE 4.1: SCR EVENTS PER BRICS COUNTRY FROM 2010 TO 2017 
Source: Primary Data 
 
The dataset consisted of 23 banks, which comprised three banks from Brazil, three from Russia, 
four from China, five from South Africa and eight from India.   The number of banks selected for 






















































































FIGURE 4.2: BANKS PER COUNTRY 
Source: Primary Data 
 
The BRICS as emerging countries were chosen because they are rapidly developing countries 
and have a great influence on the global market (Morazán, Knoke, Knoblauch & Schäfer, 2012).  
The focus was on banks as they offer many benefits that assist in the development of an economy, 
such as gathering savings from multiple sources and offering investors the chance to borrow 
these funds and invest in productive sectors (De Ferro, 2013).  The stock exchanges of each of 
the BRICS countries were included in the sample as they have the active banks. The stock index 
was used to judge the impact of the SCRs on the banks’ share prices.   A t-test was performed to 
test the significance of the event on the emerging market banks’ share prices. 
 
4.3 ANALYSIS OF DATA 
 
BRICS banks’ daily share prices and credit ratings from Moody’s, S&P and Fitch were analysed 
to identify, describe and explore the relationship between SCRs and banks’ share prices. A 









of SCRs on share prices.  The event study attempted to measure the valuation effects of SCR 
announcements, by examining the response of the share prices to the announcement of the 
event. In a sense, this helps to understand if there is some exogenous (unanticipated) shock that 
affects some of the share prices of banks. 
The event study methodology followed a certain pattern to calculate ARs and CARs to determine 
whether a certain event affect the banks’ share prices. The traditional event study methodology 
has three steps, which were adopted in this study: 
STEP 1 (ARs): Daily ARs were calculated for each bank to explain the impact of SCRs using the 
statistical market model (Kaminsky & Schmukler, 1999). The normal returns were calculated using 
a broad-based stock index. Once the normal returns were calculated, they were deducted from 
the actual return to get the ARs on each day in the event window. The ARs of the banks’ share 
prices before or after an SCR announcement could be positive or negative, depending on the 
impact at the time of the announcement.  
A 21-day event window was used to analyse consecutive days to understand how an event 
affected a share over a relatively short period of time (MacKinlay, 1997).  
STEP 2 (CARs): Daily CARs were computed over the event window to offer a different view, in 
case the effect from the event was not immediately captured by the ARs and to rather give a net 
effect over the estimation window. The CARs were calculated by determining the cumulative 
difference between the daily share prices and the concurrent local market index for each of the 
five emerging BRICS countries in the selected sample.  
STEP 3 (t-test): A t-test was computed to determine the significance of the ARs and CARs within 
the event window. The greater the magnitude of the t-test statistics (positive or negative), the 
greater the evidence that an SCR announcement had significant effects. The nearer the t-
statistics were to 0, the greater the likelihood that the event was insignificant. For the event to be 
statistically significant at a 5% level of significance, it had to have a t-statistic of (+/- 1.98) or more. 






FIGURE 4.3: TWO TAIL HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
Source: Author 
 
If the measured t-stat is between the 2 ends, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and the 
alternative hypothesis is rejected. This is because the t-stat will be in the non-rejection area. If the 
t-stat is outside of this range, then we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative 
hypothesis because it is outside the range. 
 
4.4 INTERPRETATION OF DATA 
 
Aliaga and Gunderson (2002) explain that a quantitative study involves data collection and data 
analysis to build a coherent interpretation of data. The empirical results for upgrades and 
downgrades are presented first, followed by the results of positive and negative outlooks. The 
hypothesis is as follows:  
 
H0: Banks’ share prices do not react to sovereign SCR announcements,  




The quantitative data is presented either in table format or graphs for easy understanding. The 
graphical presentation of data (tables and charts) in numbers and percentages made it possible 
to identify a set of trends in the data. The results presented here are compared to the literature 
reviewed in Chapter 2. 
 
4.5 RESULTS REGARDING UPGRADE ANNOUNCEMENTS ON BANK SHARE PRICES 
 
The results of the event study were examined by analysing the reaction of the BRICS banks' 
share prices 10 days before the event day and 10 days after a SCR upgrade announcement. 
Table 4.1 and Figure 4.4 shows the ARs and test statistics for the respective banks following an 
SCR upgrade over the 21-day event window period. 
TABLE 4.1: ARs AND T-STATISTICS FOR BANKS BEFORE AND AFTER UPGRADES  
Days AR T-statistics 
-10 0.70% 1.55 
-9 1.10% *1.92 
-8 0.80% *2.6 
-7 0.80% 1.47 
-6 0.60% 1.31 
-5 1.10% *2.05 
-4 1.30% 0.95 
-3 1.80% 0.86 
-2 2.10% 0.89 
-1 2.00% 0.8 
0 1.80% 0.67 
1 1.40% 0.62 
2 1.80% 1.05 
3 1.20% 0.75 
4 0.90% 0.54 
5 0.90% 0.96 
6 0.90% 1.25 
7 0.70% 0.53 
8 0.60% 0.97 
9 1.00% 1.06 
10 1.70% 1.6 




FIGURE 4.4: ARs AND T-STATISTICS FOR BANKS BEFORE AND AFTER SCR UPGRADES  
Source: Primary Data 
 
The results in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.4 indicate that the ARs for upgrades are statistically 
insignificant for both pre- and post-announcement periods, except for days -8 and -5. The -8 day 
AR is -0.80% with a t-statistic of -2.60 and the -5 day AR is 1.1% with a t-statistic of 2.05. The 
significant ARs on the -8 and -5 days before the announcement could imply that some information 
leaked to the public, or that insider trading took place but there could also be other, random 
causes for them. However, this evidence suggests that the announcement effect was weak in the 
event window as it was only significant for two days of the 21-day event window.  
The results in Table 4.1 tie in well with De Ferro (2013), who also reported significant ARs for two 
days out of a 21-day event window at a 5% confidence level for upgrade announcements. De 
Ferro (2013) found an AR of 2.87% on day -2 with a t-statistic of 2.40 and an AR of 1.22% and a 
t-statistic of 2.29 on day +6. He argued that this was evidence of anticipation of the events by 
market participants, but since it was significant for only two days of the 21-day event window, he 
concluded that upgrade announcements do not have informational value. 
It could, therefore, be argued that the findings are consistent with Hand and Holthausen (1992) 






























announcement because the share prices already reflected the information contained in the 
announcement. 
The results in Table 4.1 contradict Williams et al. (2015) and Timmermans (2012), who 
ascertained that upgrades are significant and do affect the share market returns. For this reason, 
the CARs were calculated to offer a different view, in case the effects of the event were not 
immediately captured by the ARs. 
Figure 4.5 below demonstrates the CARs for SCR upgrade announcements across the emerging 
market banks. Figure 4.5 is useful as it illustrates the CARs over a 21-day period and therefore 
indicates the overall announcement effect of SCRs. 
 
 
FIGURE 4.5: CARs OF UPGRADES FOR EVENT PERIOD [-10, 0, +10], DAY 0 BEING 
ANNOUNCEMENT DATE 
Source: Primary Data 
 
Figure 4.5 indicates no clear effect of the SCR upgrade announcements, with erratic CARs 
throughout the event window. The CARs are positive for the majority of the days in the event 


































0 without showing a clear pattern and without significance for up to 10 days before and after the 
upgrade. In the case of upgrades, that the market did not react to upgrade information, as the 
share prices were not affected.  
The results in Figure 4.5 are consistent with those of Ederington and Goh (1998), who observed 
no reaction to the upgrade announcement itself. They postulated this might be because rating 
agencies are more likely to report good news to markets as opposed to bad news. Therefore, 
when CRAs announce upgrades to the market, there is no reaction. 
Figure 4.5 shows an insignificant CAR of -0.14% with a t-statistic of -0.09 on the event date. A 
similar conclusion was reached by De Ferro (2013), who found the effect on the announcement 
date was also insignificant with a CAR of 4.87% and a t-statistic of 1.66. He concluded that, in the 
case of SCR upgrades, investors do not panic. 
A similar pattern of results was obtained by Freitas and Minardi (2013), who found that when a 
rating upgrade occurred, there was no reaction from the banks’ share prices. They demonstrated 
that the CARs remained very close to 0 and there was no significance of SCR upgrade 
announcements. They suggested that the information provided by CRAs is already public 
information and is absorbed by the market before the announcement date. 
The positive CAR results obtained during the SCR upgrade announcements period in Figure 4.5 
are consistent with the study conducted by Choy et al. (2006). They concluded that there was no 
evidence of an economically or statistically significant response to an announcement of an 
upgrade. They posited that the lack of impact of an upgrade is in line with the idea that companies 
are more prompt in releasing favourable or positive information and this is factored into the 
returns. Contrary to the findings of this current study, Karimu (2020) found that there were 
considerable price movements in bank share prices in response to upgrade rating 
announcements. 
Given the mixed evidence from prior literature, the overall consensus regarding the results 
obtained in this study is that the ARs and CARs portrayed no reaction of the share prices during 
the SCR upgrade announcement event window period. These findings were proved by the results 
obtained from the t-test statistics. 
60 
 
95% confidence there is no relationship between an upgrade rating event and banks’ share prices. 
The t-test statistics of ARs and CARs in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.5 imply that the market is efficient 
in handling upgrade information, as there was no significant effect on share prices before and 
after the SCR upgrade announcement. This outcome reveals that upgrade announcements do 
not have informational value. The null hypothesis is therefore accepted, i.e. that banks’ share 
prices do not react to SCR announcements. 
 
4.6 RESULTS REGARDING DOWNGRADE ANNOUNCEMENTS ON BANK SHARE PRICES 
 
The results of the event study were examined by analysing the reaction of the BRICS banks share 
prices 10 days before the event day and 10 days after a SCR downgrade announcement. 
 
Table 4.2 and Figure 4.6 shows the ARs and test statistics for the respective banks following an 
SCR downgrade over the 21-day event window period. 
 
TABLE 4.2: ARs AND T-STATISTICS FOR BANKS BEFORE AND AFTER DOWNGRADES 
Days AR T-statistics 
-10 -0.10% -0.47 
-9 -0.22% -0.45 
-8 -0.38% -0.5 
-7 -0.48% -0.7 
-6 -0.89% -1.03 
-5 -1.01% -0.58 
-4 -1.57% -0.74 
-3 -2.00% -0.72 
-2 -1.91% -0.7 
-1 -1.52% -0.53 
0 -1.46% -0.8 
1 -1.32% -0.64 
2 -1.09% -0.68 
3 -1.52% -0.81 
4 -2.07% -0.94 
5 -2.00% -0.86 
6 -1.82% -0.62 
7 -1.51% -0.51 
8 -1.41% -0.54 
9 -0.98% -0.43 
10 -1.05% -0.41 




FIGURE 4.6: ARs AND T-STATISTICS FOR BANKS BEFORE AND AFTER SCR   
DOWNGRADES 
Source: Primary Data 
The results in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.6 again suggest that there are no significant ARs. 
Additionally, Table 4.2 demonstrates that the market is efficient in handling the downgrade 
information, as none of the t-statistics for ARs is significant throughout the 21-day event window. 
This could imply that the market had already anticipated the information provided by the rating 
agencies, and therefore there were no ARs. 
These results obtained for downgrade rating announcement effects are consistent with other 
studies. De Ferro (2013) did not find significant ARs at the time of downgrade announcements. 
His findings suggest that downgrades do not bring new information to the market. Linciano (2004) 
also found that share price reactions to SCR downgrade announcements are statistically 
insignificant and postulates that share prices do not respond instantly after a downgrade, but 
rather steadily over time, which is the reason why downgrades do not convey new information.  
The findings detailed in Table 4.2 contradict the findings of Cantor and Packer (1996) and Reisen 






























in emerging economies. For this reason, the CARs were calculated to offer a different view, in 
case the effects of the event were not immediately captured by the ARs. 
Figure 4.7 below demonstrates the CARs for SCR downgrade announcements across the 
emerging market banks. Figure 4.7 is useful as it illustrates the CARs over a 21-day period and 




FIGURE 4.7: CARs OF DOWNGRADE FOR EVENT PERIOD [-10, 0, +10], DAY 0 BEING 
ANNOUNCEMENT DATE 
Source: Primary Data 
 
The CARs are mainly random, not following a specific path. The observed pattern in Figure 4.7 
support the hypothesis that SCRs may not affect banks within BRICS. During the event period for 
downgrades, CARs are negative for the majority of the days in the event window but are 
statistically insignificant for the event window. Figure 4.7 indicates that downgrades had no 
































The findings in Figure 4.7 are in line with Leonard (2013), who posited that the information content 
of a downgrade to equity investors is low and that the information resulting in the downgrade has 
already been reflected in the company’s share price. Leonard (2013) reported that the CARs for 
the event window were very small and insignificant at a 5% level of confidence. Leonard’s results 
indicate that there is no evidence to support the claim that an SCR downgrade has an impact on 
equity share prices on the days surrounding the downgrade. This implies that the information 
content of SCR downgrades to equity investors is very low. The findings of Leonard (2013) are in 
contrast to those of previous studies (Elayan, Maris & Maris, 1990; Hand & Holthausen, 1992) 
which were that SCR downgrade announcements are significant news events. 
Despite contradictory findings from prior literature, the results in this current study indicate that 
the emerging market banks are efficient, in that SCR news is reflected in bank share prices as 
shown by the statistically insignificant ARs and CARs on the day after the event, illustrated in 
Figure 4.7 and confirmed in Table 4.2 above. 95% confidence there is no relationship between 
downgrade rating announcement events and banks’ share prices.  There is significant evidence 






4.7 RESULTS REGARDING POSITIVE OUTLOOK ANNOUNCEMENTS ON BANK SHARE 
PRICES 
 
The results of the event study were examined by analysing the reaction of the BRICS banks share 
prices 10 days before the event day and 10 days after a SCR positive outlook announcement. 
 
Table 4.3 and Figure 4.8 shows the ARs and test statistics for the respective banks following an 
SCR positive outlook announcement over the 21-day event window period. 
 
TABLE 4.3: ARs AND T-STATISTICS FOR BANKS BEFORE AND AFTER POSITIVE 
OUTLOOKS 
 AR T-statistics 
-10 -0.07% -0.53 
-9 0.06% -0.29 
-8 0.05% -0.34 
-7 0.10% -0.26 
-6 -0.11% -0.38 
-5 -0.28% -0.41 
-4 -0.13% -0.68 
-3 -0.47% -0.86 
-2 -0.45% -0.72 
-1 -0.82% -0.93 
0 -0.91% -0.8 
1 -1.15% -0.71 
2 -0.97% -1.09 
3 -1.21% -0.42 
4 -0.93% -0.33 
5 -0.64% -0.44 
6 -0.85% -0.45 
7 -0.87% 0.19 
8 -1.18% 0.19 
9 -1.35% 0.28 
10 -1.25% 0.31 




FIGURE 4.8: ARs AND T-STATISTICS FOR BANKS BEFORE AND AFTER POSITIVE 
OUTLOOKS 
Source: Primary Data 
 
As expected, the results show statistically insignificant ARs on the day of the event. Table 4.3 and 
Figure 4.8 demonstrates that the market is efficient in handling the downgrade information, as 
none of the t-statistics is significant in the whole of the 21-day [-10, 0, +10] event window. The 
results in Table 4.3 show that the AR at day 0 is 0.91%, with a t-statistic of 0.8, which is 
insignificant. These results suggest that positive outlook announcements do not have 
informational value to emerging market banks. 
These results are similar to the conclusion reached by Steiner and Heinke (2001), who found that 
SCR positive outlook announcements do not cause any significant return changes. They point 
out that there were hardly any reliably significant ARs for positive outlook events in their study.  
Contrary to the findings in Table 4.3, Hand and Holthausen (1992), Hull, Predescu and White 
(2004) and Hill and Faff (2010) argue that SCR positive outlook events are more informative than 
upgrade rating announcements. For this reason, the CARs were calculated to offer a different 




































Figure 4.9 below demonstrates the CARs for positive outlook announcements across the 
emerging market banks. The graph is useful as it illustrates the CARs over a 21-day period and 
therefore indicates the overall effect of positive outlook announcements. 
 
 
FIGURE 4.9: CARs FOR POSITIVE OUTLOOK ANNOUNCEMENTS FOR EVENT PERIOD [-
10, 0, +10], DAY 0 BEING ANNOUNCEMENT DATE 
Source: Primary Data 
 
The CARs illustrated in Figure 4.9 are mainly random, not following a specific path. These results 
indicate no market reaction to positive outlook announcements since there are no significant 
CARs. The results also confirm that the CARs are relatively close to 0 with no large fluctuations 
throughout the event window. The fluctuations in CARs are larger for the returns with peaks on 
day 3. However, the CARs still result in t-statistics below 1.96.  
Similar research carried out by Hertel (2013) and Crosta (2014) concluded that positive outlooks 
are not relevant information to investors, as no significant excess returns for the positive outlooks 
were observed in their studies. The results, therefore, imply that positive outlook announcements 






























Thus to conclude, the results show that the observed pattern of ARs for positive outlooks provides 
weak and inconsistent informational content to emerging financial markets. 95% confidence there 
is no relationship between positive outlook events and banks’ share prices. The null hypothesis 
is therefore accepted, which states that banks’ share prices do not react to SCR announcements. 
4.8 RESULTS REGARDING NEGATIVE OUTLOOK ANNOUNCEMENTS ON BANK SHARE 
PRICES 
 
The results of the event study were examined by analysing the reaction of the BRICS banks share 
prices 10 days before the event day and 10 days after a SCR negative outlook announcement. 
 
Table 4.4 and Figure 4.10 shows the ARs and test statistics for the respective banks following an 
SCR negative outlook announcement over the 21-day event window period. 
 
TABLE 4.4: ARs AND T-STATISTICS FOR BANKS BEFORE AND AFTER NEGATIVE 
OUTLOOKS 
Days AR T-statistics 
-10 -0.91% -0.21 
-9 -0.69% 0.08 
-8 -0.83% 0.04 
-7 -0.57% 0.09 
-6 -0.85% -0.09 
-5 -1.14% -0.23 
-4 -1.08% -0.11 
-3 -1.88% -0.58 
-2 -1.80% -0.74 
-1 -2.51% -1 
0 -1.70% -1.39 
1 -1.59% -1.07 
2 -2.18% -0.61 
3 -0.79% -1.06 
4 -0.69% -1.06 
5 -0.73% -0.46 
6 -0.46% -0.65 
7 0.22% -0.56 
8 0.24% -0.74 
9 0.41% -0.85 
10 0.55% -0.61 




FIGURE 4.10: ARs AND T-STATISTICS FOR BANKS BEFORE AND AFTER NEGATIVE 
OUTLOOKS 
Source: Primary Data 
 
In testing the significance of the ARs over the 21-day event window, the results reveal negative 
and insignificant ARs on the event date as seen in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.10. The t-statistics of 
the whole 21-day [-10, 0, +10] event window are insignificant and not distinctive from 0. Therefore, 
this outcome indicates that the market is efficient in handling the negative outlook information, as 
none of the t-statistics is significant. This evidence may certainly imply that negative outlook 
announcements do not have informational value.  
These results are in line with previous research by Hull et al. (2004), who found that negative 
outlooks do not contain significant information, but contradict Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002), 
Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007), and Williams et al. (2013) who found that outlook actions have a 
strong impact on bank valuations. For this reason, the CARs were calculated to offer a different 































Figure 4.11 below demonstrates the CARs for negative outlook announcements across the 
emerging market banks. The graph is useful as it illustrates the CARs over a 21-day period and 
therefore indicates the overall effect of negative outlook announcements. 
 
FIGURE 4.11: CARs FOR NEGATIVE OUTLOOK ANNOUNCEMENTS FOR EVENT PERIOD 
[-10, 0, +10], DAY 0 BEING ANNOUNCEMENT DATE 
Source: Primary Data 
 
As expected, for the 45 SCR negative outlook changes, the results show statistically insignificant 
CARs on the day of the event, and for the entire event window. CARs are negative for the majority 
of the days in the event window but are statistically insignificant for the event window. The CARs 
appear to be close to 0 throughout the event window. These findings imply that the SCR 
information for negative outlook announcements does not affect the banks of emerging markets. 
Similar results were found by Crosta (2014), namely that negative outlook announcements are 
insignificant events. In line with these results, Cantwell (2000) argues that outlook 
announcements are outdated and add limited value to the market. 
Overall, the event study results suggest that the information value of an SCR in BRICS is too 
































between negative outlook events and banks’ share prices. The null hypothesis is therefore 
accepted, which states that banks’ share prices do not react to SCR announcements. 
 
The results of the empirical analysis for SCR’s (Upgrades, Downgrades, Positive Outlook, 
Negative Outlook) in BRICS emerging market countries are relatively weak with no significant 
effects to banks share prices. This shows that BRICS banks are resilient and remain competitive 
as compared to some developing countries banks, that are impacted by SCR changes Linciano 
(2004). Banks may anticipate, and not react directly after rating changes because outlook 
announcements. Banks also perform significant stress testing scenarios to anticipate the risk of 
SCR downgrades to calculate the financial resources required should a downgrade occur. 
 
The BRICS operating climate has been difficult in recent years because of political uncertainty. 
The result is market volatility, lack of confidence and low bank growth. The results showed that 
both foreign and domestic investors are resilient in emerging markets while investing in low-
growth economies with uncertainty such as inefficient public enterprises, political turmoil, 




This research had certain limitations, which are listed below: 
 
 The focus was on the top banks (Brazil: Itaú Unibanco, Banco do Brasil, Banco Bradesco; 
Russia: Sberbank, VTB Bank, Gazprombank; India: State Bank of India, Bank of Baroda, 
ICICI Bank, Punjab National Bank, HDFC Bank Ltd, Canara Bank, Axis Bank Ltd, City 
Union Bank of India; China: China Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China 
Construction Bank Corporation, China Agricultural Bank of China, China Bank of China, 
ACGBY US Equity; South Africa: Capitec, Standard Bank, Nedbank, Barclays, First 
Rand), which were listed on the all-share index based on market capitalisation. These 
banks have most of the market share in each of the emerging countries, which means 
they are the largest publicly traded banks in the emerging markets. The smaller capital 




 The study focused only on the banking sector and did not take into account the other 
financial institutions, or rather the other listed corporations on the all-share index of the 
emerging market countries. 
 
 SCR announcements from 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2017 were used and not all 
the ratings since the countries began receiving ratings. 
 
 Only the long-term foreign currency debt ratings were studied and not the short-term local 




This chapter presents evidence on banks’ reactions to SCR news announcements in five 
emerging countries during the period 2010 to 2017.  
The event study methodological approach was adopted to test for significant ARs over a 21-day 
event window. The results of this study show that there was no significant market return 
movements in bank share prices for upgrades. Similarly, SCR downgrades produced insignificant 
market reactions to the credit rating announcements. The results for the positive and negative 
outlooks are in line with the findings in the prior literature, which note that outlook events are 
insignificant news events. 
These findings imply that SCR information does not improve market efficiency since banks’ 
returns are semi-strong form efficient. In conclusion, SCR information is not relevant to emerging 
markets. Thus, these results indicate that the hypothesis that banks’ share prices do react to SCR 





CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This research set out to investigate the effect of sovereign credit rating announcements on the 
share price of banks in emerging markets. Research conducted in the area of credit rating 
announcements has been performed with a particular focus on developed markets; however, little 
empirical research has been conducted on emerging market countries. Thus, this study focused 
on the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) emerging markets. 
 
An overview of the study is presented in the next section which indicates the research problem 
and research question. Thereafter the results are given according to the research question, and 
finally, conclusions are drawn and recommendations made. The reliability and validity of the data 
are then highlighted, followed by the contributions of the empirical analysis. The limitations are 
then discussed and possible avenues for future research are identified. The chapter concludes 
with a summary of the value of this research.  
 
5.2 OVERVIEW  
 
Emerging markets currently offer higher investment growth than developed countries, yet 
investors are sceptical of investing in these markets because of their high risk (Smith & Dyakova, 
2014). Their scepticism is guided by the high uncertainty and major political risk associated with 
these countries, and with information asymmetries that are harmful to foreign investors. To 
address this, CRAs offer increased transparency on sovereign default risk to reduce information 
asymmetry. This has positive effects on the domestic banking sector and is a catalyst for the 
growth of the country's economy.  
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The deterioration in credit ratings in emerging countries affects financial institutions, particularly 
banks. This puts a greater strain on an already tough economic climate within these countries 
and reduces access to foreign investment capital. The downgrade announcements in the BRICS 
countries are shown in Figure 5.1 below. 
 
FIGURE 5.1: DOWNGRADE ANNOUNCEMENTS OF BRICS COUNTRIES FROM 2010 TO 
2017 
Source: Primary data 
 A downgrade of a country’s credit ratings increases the cost of borrowing, which means that 
banks will see lower returns and gaining access to international investments becomes difficult. 
Additionally, credit rating downgrades put a strain on economic activity and reduce the profitability 
of banks. Consequently, to investigate whether SCR announcements impact the BRICS emerging 
market banks, the following research question was posed: 
Do credit rating announcements generate any additional information to the financial 
market? 
To find possible solutions to the research question, a literature review (chapter 2) was conducted 
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on financial markets is significant as they bridge the information gap between investors and 
issuers of securities (Williams et al. 2013; Almeida, Cunha, Ferreira & Restrepo, 2017). In 
contrast, Ferreira and Gama (2007) report that SCR announcements are a repetition of 
information that is already available to the market and therefore there is no financial impact on 
the market. In addition, Ederington et al. (1987), Goh and Ederington (1993) and Jorion et al. 
(2005) acknowledged the impact of SCR announcements on developed markets, but little 
empirical research has been conducted on emerging market countries. In light of this gap, this 
study sought to expand on the work of Brooks et al. (2004) by considering the impact of SCR 
changes on emerging market countries. 
To find a link between sovereign ratings and banks’ share prices in emerging markets, an event 
study methodology was used. This is a statistical method to isolate the impact of information on 
share prices (Kothari & Warner, 2004). In line with the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), share 
prices should not react to newly released information. If this theory holds true, SCR 
announcements should have no impact on the banks’ share prices. To test this theory, a 
quantitative research methodology was implemented, using an experimental research design. A 
dataset of 83 SCR announcements and 23 banks were selected for the period 2010 to 2017 from 
the BRICS countries. The data were analysed and the results obtained are summarised in the 
next section. 
 
5.3 RESULTS   
 
The results of the event study show that SCR announcements and outlook announcements did 
not affect BRICS banks. No changes were observed in the banks’ share prices following an SCR 
announcement. All banks generated insignificant ARs and CARs. The results confirm that the 
BRICS banking industry is efficient in absorbing the rating announcements because the ARs 
before and after the event date were insignificant. In general, this would suggest that investors 





This is in line with the semi-strong form market efficiency hypothesis, which suggests that the 
market share price reflects all public and private information. All the evidence in the results points 
to a strong rejection of this hypothesis in the case of both upgrades and downgrades.  
 
H0: Hypothesis 1 (Null): Banks’ share prices do not react to 
credit rating announcements. 
Accepted 
H1: Hypothesis 1 
(Alternative): 




5.4 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY 
 
The event study methodology that was used has been employed by many other scholars, over 
different types of data, markets and periods, thus providing validity and reliability to the approach 
used. To reduce biases and errors across the data, the event windows were kept “clean” by 




The results are valid because a short-term event window was used to eliminate any confounding 
events that may have affected the banks’ share price. This study did not investigate a long event 
window post the announcement date as shorter estimation periods are more reliable about the 
returns generated (Eckbo et al, 2007). 
Infrequent trading suggests that the capital market might not be efficient, questioning the validity 
of the share price reaction. To ensure that the data were valid, the banks chosen had to frequently 
trade on the stock market and show sufficient trading volumes.  
To eliminate any bias parameters between the time series of returns in the banks’ shares and 
market index returns, the time series of prices between the banks’ shares and the reference 
(market indices) were matched. 
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To ensure that the results were not biased, the all-share indices were chosen as they contain the 





The study used a 21-day event window to test for significance, and a significance level of 5% 
were used to make sure that the study results were reliable. Testing for significance also 
examined whether the research outcome is significant or not. 
 
The data collected of the Bloomberg database were cross-checked against Trading Economics 
to eliminate the subject error. The platforms for data collection used for this study are reliable 
sources of data as the companies that collect and collate the data are reputable. The data were 
collected and stored without undergoing any transformation for robustness and completeness. 
 
5.5 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY  
 
Considerable insight has been gained into the effects of changes in SCRs on the banks in 
emerging countries. It is proposed that investors should not place substantial emphasis on these 
ratings when making investment decisions in emerging countries as the market is efficient and 
credit ratings do not offer new information to the market. 
 
This study makes a significant contribution to literature in the area of credit rating announcements 
in emerging countries. As emerging markets experience growth in trade because of their higher 
interest rates compared to developed countries, they remain risky and volatile. Consequently, this 
research contributes new credit rating information and its impact on BRICS banks.  
 
Lastly, to the author’s knowledge, this study is the first to provide detailed insight into banks’ 
reactions to credit rating announcements within the BRICS emerging market countries. By 
understanding the impact of SCR announcements on the share prices of banks, investors and 






This study was limited by the sample of banks. Due to the constraint of five emerging countries, 
this study was only able to cover 83 SCR announcements and 23 banks. The study examined 
only larger banks within the BRICS countries and not the smaller banks. As a result, due to the 
concentration of the large banks, the findings of this analysis may be biased towards some of the 
small cap banks. 
 
Aside from the data restriction, there are certain drawbacks to the methodology. The length of the 
event window is a concern. If the window selected is too short, the effect of information leakage 
before the announcement and the subsequent market reaction a few days after the 
announcement cannot be captured. If set too wide, unexpected co-existing incidents (also known 
as "confounding factors") would affect the share reaction and thus the return of the banks may be 
skewed.  
 
5.7 IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGULATORS AND INVESTORS 
 
This study has implications for investors, governments, pension funds and asset holders as it 
provides them with country risk assessments and enables them to rebalance their portfolios as 
required. It also has an impact on evaluating investments and determining the cost of capital, 
which affect asset allocation decisions. 
 
5.7.1 PROFESSIONAL INVESTMENT COMMUNITY 
 
The results reveal that BRICS banks are resilient to SCR announcements. Therefore, large 
institutional and foreign investors that are seeking profitable investment strategies within 
emerging markets should participate in investing within the BRICS emerging markets. This could 







The findings of this dissertation could be used for policy formulation. Monetary authorities are 
increasingly using the information contained in the prices of banks assets to gauge market growth, 
inflation expectations and market views on economic prospects. Therefore, understanding the 
relationship between bank shares in relation to credit ratings has a significant effect on the 
formulation and execution of policies, asset allocation and risk management strategies of 
investors. Consequently, understanding the impact of credit rating effects on financial markets is 
important for fiscal and monetary policymakers. 
 
This work has proved that regulators should continue to maintain prudence in developing growth 
policies and building a favourable investment climate that encourages transparency and 
disclosure. The research suggests that the policy makers should encourage other countries to 




While there has been a growing literature on credit ratings in developed countries, studies 
that measure the impact of SCR announcements on emerging countries banks are still 
scarce. Therefore, this study is based on a less studied sample that draws new data on 
the relationship between SCR and the BRICS banks. Emerging markets are 
characterized by limited knowledge, high risk assets, liquidity difficulties, relatively few 
stakeholders, lack of transparency, low quality of organizations, and greater instability 
(Mutize, 2018). Therefore, it could be counterproductive to generalize BRICS financial 
markets as equivalent to other regional emerging markets, and so this study draws 
conclusions from new and relevant data and ultimately contributing to body of knowledge 




5.8 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This research has given rise to many questions in need of further investigation. Further work 
needs to be carried out to establish whether using a larger sample and collecting data over a 
longer period will give the study more depth and breadth to any statistical results that will be 
extracted. 
Further experimental investigations are needed to estimate different analysis methods such as 
bootstrapping the data, as done by Essaddam and Mnasri (2015), as well as panel data analysis 
of Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002). This could be useful in determining whether the results still 
hold under different methodologies. 
It is recommended that further research be undertaken to identify the spillover effects of sovereign 
ratings on surrounding BRICS countries. 
Future studies should focus on other financial institutions such as insurance and financial advisory 
companies. An evaluation could then be made whether the results would be significantly different. 
Future studies on the current topic are therefore recommended to continue with this methodology 





This study investigated the impact of SCR announcements on banks’ equity returns over the 
period 2010 to 2017. In particular, it investigated the sovereign rating effects in the BRICS 
emerging market banks. An event study methodology was used to test for the change in market 
efficiency over a 21-day event window. 
Results of this study indicate that the SCR announcements had no significant effect on the 
efficiency of the BRICS banks. The banks are semi-strong form efficient which entails that credit 
ratings are not useful for predicting banks share price movements. Announcements of SCRs do 
not significantly change the banks’ share prices because they are already perceived to be risky 
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markets, and thus attract mostly passive and long-term investors (Mutize, 2018). Collectively, the 
results appear consistent with those of Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) and Brooks et al. (2004), 
Correa et al. (2014).  
The present findings confirm that even though the BRICS emerging markets are relatively small 
compared to developed markets, they appear to be highly efficient. The efficiency indicated by 
the results suggests that the BRICS banking industry consists of numerous sophisticated policies 
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